Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies
Volume 18

Article 9

9-1-2000

Vol. 18, Pi Sigma Alpha Review
Sigma: A Journal of Political and International Studies

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma

Recommended Citation
Studies, Sigma: A Journal of Political and International (2000) "Vol. 18, Pi Sigma Alpha Review," Sigma:
Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 18 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol18/iss1/9

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU
ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Sigma
A Journal of Political and International Studies

Fall 2000

Sigma
A Journal of Political and International Studies
Editor
Eric R. Carlson

Stafl
Adria Bennett
Scth Blaylock
Jenny Cook
A. Scott Fleming
~Iarcie Holloman
Sonia Jimcncz
Katic Kelly
Dawn Lammers
Carl D. JxSucur

Thanks to

Taylor Mammcn
I'-.cnt Nielscn
Amy Norton
Ngaio J. Palmcr
I'-.atie Smith
Kimbcrh Spears
Daniel J Stewart
Erica Thcobakl
Kacey \'\'iddison-Joncs

tllI:follo1J'il~f!,factllt)'for

Linda Hunter Adams
Ray Christcnsen
John Griffin

t/Jeir auistance:

Darren Ha\vkins
Cory Lconard
Jeff Ringer

S(i',1!la: /1 Jotlmal 0/ Political and illternational StlldieJ is a multidisciplinary journal that serves as a publishing forum
for undergraduate student papers in the fields of political science and international studies. Sigma is sponsored
by BYU chapters of Pi Sil-,>ma Alpha (the Political Science Honors Society) and Sil-,>ma Iota Rho (the International
Studies Honors Society). For more information on these student organizations, please see their respecti\T web
pages at http://fhss.byu.edu/polsci/psa.htm and http://kennedy.byu.edu/studcncprograms/sigma. Please see
the online version of S(i',l1Ia at http://b)usigma.homepage.com.
Papers for the Winter 2001 issue of S(r,lIla may be submitted to 745 S\'\'l(T. \X'e accept papers written on a broad
range of topics related to political science or international studies. There is no page limit. Please submit three
copies of papers (double-sided preferred). The author's name should not appear anywhere on the pages of the
paper. Authors will fill out an information sheet at the time of submission. The journal is published at the end
of Fall and \X'inter semesters. Sigma also welcomes students of all levels of experience who are interested in
assisting with the selecting, editing, and publishing processes. For more information on these issues, email the
editors at Sigma@bw.edu.
Cover design copyright © 2000 Neal \X: Cox and \X'alter Rhead.
All articles and reviews copyright © 2000 by respective authors.

CONTENTS
ARTICLES
Israeli Values, Israeli Control

7

Nathan Toronto

Just Cause

21

Brvan Fisher

Cross-National Women's Economic Equality in 1993

27

Joshua Lloyd

Political Islam and Secular Democracy:
"'

35

The Rise of the Refah Party in Turkey
Brock Taylor

45

i\lachoism and the Rape Epidemic in South Africa
Shima Baradaran

BOOIZ REVIEWS
The

LeeYUS

and the Olive Tree

53

bv Thomas L. Friedman
Reviewed by A. Scott Fleming

Political Polici~g: The United States and Latin America
by Martha K. Huggins
Reviewed by Kacer Widdison-Jones

54

ISRAELI VALUES,
ISRAELI CONTROL
NATHAN TORONTO

Piilestilli{lIls lil'iIZ!!' ill I.rrae!:r o[(JfPied territories do /lot tlljo)' tbe sallie pO/itim/, cilJil, or IllIlJlan I~~hts {/J their Lrraeli
1lf{!!,/JI}OIJ. IsmI'D de.rire to (rMte (/ jm'isb, deIJlomili[ state ill tbeir birtonc /Jomelalld Ila.r led tJ.lem to I'io/ate tIle ba.ri[
r{!!,hts of l/ol/~lf}}i.r/, illb,,/;ifallt.r.

Tbe .roldifl; lIollcJ.lalallti), and witl, a distillrl air 0/
rollti!le, Pllt Ollt a balld to stop tbe Mil IN ]J'ere in. He
opmed tIle slidil{~ door (lIId said mrli)', "PaHports." I
mllid tell bi.r l:/{l!.lisb J1'aJ lIotbilZI!. to /m{!!, a/JOllt /mll//Je
he didn't lIJe a t'Ulllplde sentellce and bi.r pronllnciation
]J'm [are/eH. ;\Jitpi,kine.rJ mide. I decided t/.wt I }}'aJ nol
RoilZ!!' to bllmor Ili.r reCjm,r/. I opflled tbe paill/.r O/III}'
iWlldr ill c\'a,rperatioll, slm(l!.l!,ed III), sllOlIlder.r, and .laid
m{lttfl'~oH;'dly, "Rllt I 'III all "ll11enmll. " He pallJed He
Iwd IIIlderJtood ]J'bal I'd;lt.rt .raid. 11"bell I'd realized
]J.Ji{/1 ] 'd J'aid, it ]J't/.r a/I] coll/d do to keep from lal(l!,bil{i!,
ill I)i.r}lce. He did a bal/ tum {/}}'{l),/rolll IIff, still
.rpeecb!e.rs. and tbell tllrned back arollnd, /JlllllIblilZI!.
.romet/.lil{i!,. He lI'a.r abollt 10 "'WI'er IIH }]'/JeJl bi.r .wpen·or
approac/.lf(/, pllJbed Ililll (/}}'{/)', (lIld Ibm Jlalllllled tbe door
slllIt. IlJllllediate/f', ollr dril'er .rpf(/ oil.' 1.r IN ItlI{i!,/Jed
lleartil), abou! wl)at badjllJt l}(lppened, if also oCClirred to
lIIe tli{/t if I bad befll P{ile.rtillian, perbap.r Illy .fIlott)'
remark JI'olild ha/'e elicited t/ ,'ery dijjermt re.rjJoflJe.
-Author', Journal, May 3, 1999

eing an American gave me special privileges
that night. Essentially, I was asking to be ex~
empt from the rules, to be treated differently than
people normally are. While living in Jerusalem, I
often heard stories of the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDf7) detaining, questioning, and even beating
Palestinians who defied their orders, I was being
defiant as well, but I sensed, at the same time, that
I was above the rules for Palestinians because I was
a non~Arab and an American. There is a dual value
system-implicitly understood in lsrael-dictating
that Palestinians should not receive the same treat~
ment that others do. There are different rules for
Palestinians than there are for Israelis. Fortunately
for me, the rules that apply to Israelis also apply
to Americans.
\,\'hen Israel occupied the West Bank and
Gaza in June 1967, it became apparent that Israel
would not view Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the
same light. At the time, Joseph Weitz, a prominent
Zionist leader, emphasized "the need to sustain

B
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the character of the state which will henceforth be
Jewish, and ob\'iously in the near future, b\' the
majority of its inhabitants, with a non-Jewish
minorit\' limited to 15 percenL'" j\ member of the
I,-nesset (1\\1'-), Shulamit Aloni, blasted this \'iew
as a double standard when arguing against the text
of the 1980 foundation of Legislation La\\', which
indirectly allowed the courts to discriminate against
non-Jews:
This Idiscrimination] is the reason for the
objection to add to the proposed law the principles of the Declaration of Independence. This
is the reason wh\, the text of the law does not
include the phrase ... "principles of freedom,
justice, honest\' and peace \vithout discrimination for reasons of origin, race, nationalit\',
religion or sex." Such non-discrimination stands
contrary tn the "heritage of Israel" as it is
interpreted today in the state of I sraei.'
The dual value s\'Stem underlying Israeli snciet\'
since 1967 has created a control S\'stem, leading
to systematic human rights yiolations by Israel in
the \Vest Bank and the Gaza Strip. To establish the
causal link between this dual value system and
systematic human rights abuses in the occupied
territories, I will describe the tripartite value s\'stem
upon which Zionists founded Israel. Then I will
explain hmv Israel's occupation of the \X'est Bank
and Gaza in 1967 challenged this tripartite Yalue
s\'stem, which in turn led to the development of
the dual yalue system. Finally, I will outline the
process by which the Israeli polit\' entrenched
these dual values in control techniques responsible
for extensive abuses of Palestinians' human rights
in the occupied territories since 1967.;
TilE PRF-I96 7 TRlmRTITF V,\U'F SYSTEI\!

Zionist leaders had three goals in mind when
they created the state of Israel in 1948: to create a
democratic state, to form a Jewish state, and to
establish a state in the ancestral Land of Israel
(which, they envisioned, would extend roughly
from the l\lediterranean Sea to the Jordan Riyer).'
_1 Democratic Slale. Peter Meckling calls democracy "a set of normative ideals and a pattern of
rule. Central to it are such key values as liberty
and equality, which are simultaneously ends in

8·
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themseh-es and means for attaining government b\'
the people in the sense of responsiveness to popular preferences."~ The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1\\a\' 14, 1(48),' the
premier document in Israel's legal code, dearh'
envisions this set of ideals and pattern of rule for
the citizens of its tledgling state:
The state of Israel will be based on freedom,
justice and peace as envisaged Iw the prophets
of Israel; it will ensure complete equalit\- of
social and political rights to all its inhabitants
irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will
guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education, and culture; it will safeguard
the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be
faithful to the principles of the Charter of the
United ;\lations.The aim of creating a democratic state dates
back to before Israel's founding. In 1942, the Extraordinary Zionist Conference adopted the Biltmore
Program, in which it reaftirmed its unequiwJCal
devotion to the cause of democratic freedom and
international justice to which the people of the
United States, allied with the other United ~ations,
have dedicated themselves and give expression to
their faith in the ultimate \'ictory of humanit\- and
justice over lawlessness and brute force.'
Instilling democratic ideals into its political
S\'stem was a primary goal of the new Israeli state,
Zionist leaders-and after 1948, Israelis themseh-es
-wanted a democratic state to preserve unfailinghthe freedom and equality that Jews had not
experienced for centuries.
,4 je1l'isJ) Sir/If. No less important to Israel's
Zionist founders was the establishment of a state
for Jews. Theodor Herzl, the father of the Zionist
movement, called for "the restoration of the
Jewish State" in his 1896 pamphlet Der jlldflls/atl/,
writing, "No one can den\' the gravity of the situ~
ation of the Jews. \Xiherever they live in perceptible numbers, they are more or less persecuted.'"
In the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel, Zionist leaders wrote that it is
"the natural right of the Jewish people to be
masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in
their own sovereign State."'" Nahum SokolO\\'
argued in 1919 that the principle of Zionism is "'a

NATHA:\i TOROl\:TO

Homeland for the Jewish people," pointing out
that Je\vs "hm'e gro"'n tired of their role of a
homeless Chosen People, and would prefer to be a
self-supporting 'small nation,' with a quiet spot of
earth for themselves."" The need to establish a
Jewish state was indeed imperative to those who
founded IsraeL They knew, moreover, that without
making israel a haven for Jews, many of their
people would fear that another Holocaust could
occur in Palestine.
." 1 Sta!e ill !/Je .".JIICf.rtml Lalld The founders of
Israel also recognized the importance of establishing their state in the Land of Israel, or l:retz
i.rraei, extending from the I\Iediterranean Sea
to the Jordan River. Herzl recognized the centralit\,
of the land to the Jewish psyche: "Palestine is our
ever-memorable historic home. The very name of
Palestine would attract our people with a force
of man'elous potency."" The Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel begins with
these words, which represent the special place that
Palestine holds in the Jewish heart:
Eretz-lsrael (the Land of Israel) was the
birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their
spiritual, religious and political identity was
shaped. Here the\' tlrst attained statehood,
created cultural values of national and universal
significance and gave to the world the eternal
Book of Books.';
Even after the founding of the state, one of
the principal aims of the \X'orld Zionist Organization was "the ingathering of the Jewish People
in its historic homeland, Eretz YisraeL"" Even
Herut, the long-time opposition party to mainstream Zionism, agreed, claiming that "the Hebrew
homeland, whose territory extends on both sides
of the Jordan, is a single historical and geographic
uniL"" Je\vish history dictated, according to all
segments of Jewry, that the Jewish homeland
should be in Palestine. SokolO\\l holds that "the
goal of [Zionist] efforts [was] to be united in an
organic community, to feel entirely at home," in all
aspects of their society-'" It is interesting to note,
moreover, that the declaration establishing Israel
did not delineate any borders for the new state.'Palestine was the birthplace of Judaism, and
Zionists felt it essential to build the Jewish home-

land there, but it was not certain at the beginning
how large the homeland would be.
The goal of the nascent state of Israel was
to be a Jewish democratic state nestled in the
ancestral homeland of the Jews. In reality, however,
although the state \vas Jewish and democratic, its
territory' comprised only about half of what
Zionists considered Eretz , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IsraeL David Ben-Gurion
convinced his people to
be patient, telling them
that the time would come
when they could accomplish their final goal of
living in all of IsraeL"
After 1948, Israelis had
a Jewish democratic state,
but it wasn't until after the
Six-Day \'\'ar in 1967, when Israel gained control of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that Israelis
gained the opportunin' to live in all of Eretz IsraeL

For Israel, controlling
the territory was
highly desirable, yet
the inhabitants of the
terntones were highly
undesirable.

Acquiring all of the Land of Israel came with
a price. Once again, Israelis could still satisfy
only two of their three goals. Approximately one
million Palestinian Arabs were living in the newly
acquired territory of the \X'est Bank and Gaza,
forcing Israelis to face three options, none of
which satistled all the goals they had pursued in
originally establishing their state. First, they could
formally annex the new territory and remain a Jewish state. But that would mean curtailing Israeli
democracy by severely limiting the civil and human
rights of the indigenous Palestinian population.
Second, Israelis could formally annex the territories and keep their democracy. This would cost
the state its Jewish identity, since Arabs, given
demographic trends, would soon outnumber Jews.
I t would alter the state's Jewish character if
Palestinians enjoved full political participation.
Third, they could remain a democratic Jewish state.
However, that would mean either giving up the
territories or getting rid of the Palestinian population b\· mass transfer-something the international
community would not countenance-which meant,
essentially, that they would have to give up the West
Bank and Gaza.'"
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This dilemma asked Israelis to answer diftlcult
questions. "\\'ho were they? A nation of Jews Jiving
in all the land of Israel, but not democratic? A
democratic nation in all the land of Israel, but not
Jewish? Or a Jewish and democratic nation, but
not in all the land of Israel?"'" To the Labor g(Nernment of 1967, one thing was benmd debate: "Israel
must remain a state with a predominantly Jewish

democrac\' in which Israelis participated fulh' but
Palestinians did not.
The solution to this philosophical dilemma was
to ignore it altogether. The biographer of Israeli
statesman i\/enachem Begin pointed out that
"Begin did not acknowledge the existence of a
'Palestinian problem,"'" ;\ccording to one Israeli
sociologist, the Israeli polit\, felt that "the best
solution ,vould he for these people [palestinians

majority. [Those in the Labor part\'1 agreed that
annexation of the territories would eventually
threaten the Jewish character of the State of
Israel."" For Israel, controlling the territon' ,vas
highly desirable in order to define its character as

in the territoriesl to e\"aporate miraculoush'."'" "-\s
Thomas f<riedman describes it, it was as if Israelis
had taken a ride on the Nn\" York subway:

a Jewish state extending throughout Eretz Israel;
yet, for the same reason, the inhabitants of the terri-

Sometimes YOU get on the subway at Grand
Central Station and take the last seat in the car,

tories were highly llildesirable." Despite the jubilation of finall," acquiring all of Eretz Israel in 196 7 ,
Israelis still faced a very difficult dilemma: \X"hich of
their three goals were they willing to give up?

The train moves on to the next station and who

TilE DE\'EL()P.\IEJ'.:T ()F TilE Dt'.\L V,\UE SYSTEJ\I

Israel answered that it was not willing to give
up any of its three goals, This answer required a
psychological shift in the Israeli polity. If Israel
would not give up the land, and it would not give
up its democracy or its Jewishness, then Israelis
necessarily had to think of Palestinians as deserving fewer rights than Israelis. This made it
possible for Israel to make a de facto annexation of
the land, excluding the land's inhabitants from
political participation, while not

Violence against
Arabs often goes
unpunished
whereas violence 0;
Arabs is very
harshly dealt with
even before a trial.

actualh' making the territories
part of Israel. Thus, Israelis
could have a Jewish democrac,'
within the pre-l96 7 borders of
Israel and still extend their
statehood from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. As
Y oram Peri describes it, "\'Vhile
the territ,ories are not yet an

integral part of the State of
Israel, neither are they external
to it."'; Israelis would not support a return to the

should get on but a little old lad" carrying t\\'O
hig grocery bags, What is the tlrst thing you do"
You take Fue j\'cJI' ) (Jrk Til//e.r '"OU are reading
and put it up in front of ~'our face, em"erini'
your eyes, because if your eye meets her e,'e,
you are going to have to give up your seat.'In order to aehie\"e all three of their collective
goab, Israelis had to il-,rnore that a problem existed
in offering fewer political rights to a Palestinian than
to an Israeli, \X"hat deYeioped, then, was a dual \~alue
system "characterized b,' totally different rules of
the game, cultures and institutional arrangements
applied in different spheres of actiyit\' for yarious
components of the control system.""
E\,IDEl\:CES OF TilE Dl',\L V,\JXI', SYSTFM

It did not take long for the dual value system to
appear in the occupied territories, Soon after the
1967 war, Menachem Begin "asserted that Israeli
law and jurisdiction must be extended to what he
called the liberated territories."'" Less than three
weeks after the war, the Knesset passed legislation
extending Israeli law to all territon' acquired in the
1967 war.;" Since 1948, however, the Knesset has

status quo ante bellum, as Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol iterated one week after the 1967 conflict:
"The position that existed until now shall never
again return."'! However, this entailed the creation

also declared that a state of emergency exists in
Israel, allowing the Israeli government to enforce
both military and civilian la,," in the terri ton" it
controls. In reality, Israel applies militan' law onh'
to Palestinians in the territories, for example, b,~
trying Palestinians in military courts and Israelis in
civilian courts, \I It applies civilian law inside Israel's

of a selective democracy in the Israeli psyche, a

pre-1967 borders, in East Jerusalem and the Golan

,
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Heights (Israel annexed those areas after the 1i.J()7
\,-ar), and in the occupied territories, but onh' in
cases involving Israelis," The Defense (Emergency)
Regulations are the basis for Israeli military law, and
even leading Jewish lmn'ers opposed the regulations when the British imposed them in 1945. One
of these law\'ers, Dr. Dov Yosef, commented at
that time:

Even Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem was
selective. "Although Israel's extension of jurisdiction
in 1967 was such as to give Israel full national authority in hast Jerusalem, it was selective enough to
avoid granting full citizenship rights to the Palestinian majority in East Jerusalem."" Specitlcally, the
Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem could
not vote in national Knesset , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
elections,;" and the Israeli

Is the administration to be allO\ved

to interfere

in the lives of the people with no protection
for the individual? j\s it is, there is no guarantee
to prevent a citizen from being imprisoned for
life without trial. There is no protection for the
freedom of the individual: there is no appeal
against the decision of the military commander, no means of resorting to the Supreme
Court . . . while the administration has unrestricted freedom to banish am'. citizen at am'.
moment. \X'hat is more, a man does not actually
have to commit an offense; it is enough for a
decision to be made in some office for his fate
to be sealed."
Also, Israel tends to be more lenient on Jews
than on Palestinians. I n the 19HOs, "a member of
the Knesset suggested changing the criminal law so
that a Jew \\'ho kills an Arab for nationalist reasons
would not be prosecuted according to the existing criminal law, but dealt with preferentially.""
Though this suggestion never became law, lenienc\'
was the norm for soldiers who killed Palestinians
during the ilili/{/(/(/, the popular Palestinian uprising that began in late 19H7. In the first half of
the ilili/ada, the IDF killed six hundred Arabs using
live ammunition." Weak disciplinary procedures
and concern for morale tended "to exonerate the
security force even in the face of clear evidence of
over-reaction on their part."'"
Israel also treats Jewish settlers in the occupied
territories \vith lenience. According to one report,
'\-iolence aJ!,aifIJl Arabs often goes unpunished
whereas violence I)), Arabs is ver)' harshly dealt with
even before a trial. 1\S far as the settlers are concerned, the territories are alread\' part of Israelthe Arab population is largely excluded from the
resulting benefits.";- The rules of the game have
dictated preferential treatment for Israelis in the
occupied territories.

government issued them blue
identification cards to clistinguish them from their Jewish
counterparts, while dem'ing
them Israeli citizenship and
passports. ,,,

Israel's political system
developed a status quo
policy that ignored the
philosophical problems
inherent in a democratic state subjecting a
minority ethnic population to military rule.

i\[oreover,
Palestinian
workers in Israel do not enJOY the same rights as Israeli
workers. None are members of the national workers'
union, Histadrut, and their employers can dismiss
them ljuite easily. In addition, "the\, are us.ually paid
less than Jews in the same jobs; they do not get
many of the fringe benefits which their Jewish
colleagues enjm'; they do not get anything in return
for the national insurance and pension contributions automatically deducted from their wages
(if they are employed legally).""
Meir Vilner, a member of the Democratic
Front for Peace and Equality, an Israeli political
party, attacked the double standard that exists for
Arabs and Jews in Israel:

\'('hat is the "democratic character" [of the
State of Israelp In my yiew, even today this
democratic character is very limited .... There
is discrimination against the Arab population in
Israel, in . . . all domains of life. Lands are
stolen on racialist nationalist grounds. Is this
democracy? Arab students are expelled from
universities, Is this democracy?12
Israel has also rejected the Palestinians' right to
being a "people." \\inen the 1978 Camp David
Accords made reference to "the Palestinian people,"
Prime Minister i\Ienachem Begin held that "the
expressions 'Palestinians' or 'Palestinian people'
are being and will be construed and understood, ..
[by Israel] as 'Palestinian Arabs."'"' Israel is the state
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of the 'Jewish people," but it \vill not afford the
same communal rights to Palestinians.
E~TRF"'CIli\IEt-;T (ll TilE Dl'.\L V\U'f': SYSTHI

The nature of Israel's political S\'stem helps
explain why Israel, a democratic state, has
implemented seemingly racist policies. In Israel's
proportional representation system, there is a very
low threshold requirement for parties to gain seats
in the I'-nesset. This allows parties with a small
constituency to have disproportionate power in
government." This was especialh' evident after
1%7, when the Labor party began to lose its
intluence in Israeli politics. From 19411 to 1% 7,
J\1apai (and later Labor, its successor) dominated
Israeli politics, winning every election during that
period." There was little to challenge the unity of
the Israeli polit\"o That changed in 1967, however,
with the acquisition of the occupied territories. The
dilemma that Israelis faced allowed other groups
besides i\1apai to make their impression on the
scene, leading to political gridlock and an ambivalent
position towards the occupied
territories. !\io one, including
Labor, was willing to give up
the occupied territories. And
no one, especially Labor, was
willing to annex them outright.
Instead, Israel's political system
developed a status quo policy
that ignored the philosophical
problems inherent in a demo-

the motives of these three groups helps explain
why a democratic Israel pursued undemocratic
policies in the occupied territories.
Sephardic jelJ's. "In the case of contlict between
ethnic groups, the ruling group tends to emphasize
its primordial attributes, its ethnicity, as the central
basis for defining the national collective," writes
Yoram Peri."" In 1967, Israeli society absorbed

SIGMA

Rf/{l!.i(!IIJ 1\101'1'II/1'II1.r. Ultra-religious movements
were the second group benefiting from the results
of the 1% 7 war. To these religious groups, Eretz
Israel is sacred, and the liberation of Judea and
Samaria (i.e., the occupied territories) was the first
step in establishing the messianic theocracy. Consequently, any non-Jew living there had no right
to live there, and it is the duty of these religious
groups to settle as much of the land as possible,
preparatory to ushering in the messianic reign." B\·
intluencing the political system at strategic points
and benetiting from favorable public opinion, the
most prominent of these religious groups, Gush
Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful," founded in
1( 7 4), \vas successful in injecting its ,"iews into
Israel's policies on the occupied territories.'" Israel's

political system allowed for the implementaion of
Gush norms to the extent that it helped entrench
the dual value system in Israel.
E,-en though Cush membership represented
onlY a fraction of Israel's population, broad public support
was essential to Gush Emumm's success. Polls show that,
after 1% 7, the Israeli public
was even more reticent than
the government to giye up the
territories. In 1 <)73, 74 percent
of Israelis were unwilling to
return any land to the Arabs
in return for peace, \vhich
coincides with Gush ideals. In 19711, half of the
Israeli public was still opposed to relinquishing
Istaeli control over the territories."" Indeed,
"without . . . the legitimacy it received from the
Israeli public Gush Emunim might have remained
a protest movement with no ability to transform its
ideology into a realistic enterprise.""
Gush Emunim and its allies in the ~ational
Religious Party (!\iRP) have also benefited from
the ambivalence of Labor government policies, an
ambivalence which has been the result of Israel's
political ,,·stem. From 1967 to 1977, when Labor
led the government, these religious acti,"ists would
simply establish a presence where they wanted a
settlement. Even though this was neither technically legal nor fully compliant \\lith the Labor

Settlements perpetuate and entrench
the double standard
of values governing
Israelis and
Palestinians.

cratic state subjecting a minority ethnic population to military rule.
Three segments of Israeli society had a
political interest in the entrenchment of this status
quo polin' and the dual value sYstem that went
along with it. These three groups were Sephardic
Jews, religious movements (especially Gush
Emunim), and political parties (especially Likud and
Labor, the two dominant parties). understanding

12·

about one million Arabs, effectiveh- creating a
bi-national state.'-
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party's policies, Labor officials would cave in,
providing militan' protection, sen·ices, and road
access> In fact, that is how the first settlement
began. On the e\'e of Passover-April 4, 19(1)two rabbis and a group of ()rthodox Jewish
families rented an Arab-cJ\\'ned hotel in Hebron,
the cit\· where (according to tradition) Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob are buried. The,· had told Israeli
authorities that the,·. would rent the hotel onlY for
the \veek of Passover, but when the holiday was
m'er the\' vowed to never leave the land of the
Jewish Patriarchs." Thomas Friedman describes
the reaction of the government:

application. "Onll' two-thirds [agreed] that
minority-opinion groups should be allowed to
operate freely to gain majority support for their
positions." \X'hen the survey asked respondents to
applY it to their "least liked" group, such as Peace
Now or groups connected with the PLO, popular
support decreased from 1)3 to 38 percent." This
public uncertainty towards democratic principles
weakens incentives for political parties to form
clear policies on democracy in the occupied
territories.
It has been politically inexpedient for Israeli
political parties to develop policies that would lead
to either formal annexation of or complete withEventualh' the Labor-led government, torn by
drawal from the occupied territories. The Labormixed emotions, caved in to the settlers, allowGahal coalition gO\'ernment that ruled from 1%7
ing them to sta,' in a militan' camp in Hebron
to 197() considered the status quo "the least disruptive polin' to follow" because "the mainstream
and later to build a Jewish settlement there
of
public opinion supported" its continuation.
called l....:.in·at Arba.~'
"\X'ithin the government discussion focused more
These settlements perpetuate and entrench the
on transition arrangements within the territories
double standard of values governing Israelis and
than over their ultimate and final status."'" Defense
Palestinians. ()nce a settleMinister Moshe Dayan, an
ment's foundations are laid,
advocate of de facto but not
the\' arc nearly impossible to
formal annexation, took aduproot. Due to broad public
vantage of this opportunity
support and effective politito govern the territories as he
cal maneuvering, religious
saw fit by extending Israeli
mO\'ements have succeeded
la\v to East Jerusalem; allowin sewing dualist ideals into
ing the establishment of
the patchwork of Israeli
settlements; confiscating Arab
societ\·.
land; extending Israel's road
Po/itical PartieJ. A third
network, electric grid, and
group, political parties, stands L-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---" water system to the terri,

Public uncertainty
towards democratic
principles weakens
incentives for political
parties to form clear
policies on the
occupied territories.

at the heart of the political indecisiveness surrounding Israel's policies towards the occupied
territories. This indecisiveness has led, in practice,
to status quo policies that extend Israeli control
O\'er the land but do not extend Israeli democracy
to the land's inhabitants and has ensured the
perpetuation of dualist policies in the occupied
territories as long as the indecision persists.
A 1985 stud\' revealed the public's role in this
indecisiveness. "The belief in majority rule, in
freedom of expression, in the right of the citizen
to criticize the government, and in equality before
the law" received the support of between 80 and
9() percent of the respondents. However, there was
a gap between the abstract norm and its practical

tories; creating investment incentives for Jewish
entrepreneurs in the territories (but not for
Palestinian ones); and freezing the demographic make-up of the territories by not allowing the return of refugees who had fled during
the war. sThe ambivalence of Israel towards the
occupied territories continued after 1970, as did its
continued implementation of dualist policies. The
period from 1970 to 1973 was one of "standstill
diplomacy," according to William Quandt. Gahal,
the part\' of Menachem Begin, left the broad
I,abor-Gahal coalition. This made the Labor
government even less willing to confront and
oppose the actions of Gush Emunim settlers and

SIGMA •

13

ISRM~LI VALUES, ISRAELI CONTROL

the policies of Defense Minister Dm'an in the
territories. \X'ith the psychological loss of the 197.)
war, the Labor government changed its leadership,
appointing Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yigal
Allon, who were far from unified on their policies
towards the territories. This made it even harder to
exert signitlcant pressure on militant groups
like Gush Emunim.
This, coupled with renewed opposition from
the Likud party and
Gush Emunim, further
weakened Labor's hold
on the Israeli political
system and further
ingrained its indecisiveness on the occupied
territories. "
In 1977, when
Likud unexpectedly defeated Labor, the status of
the occupied territories had still not become
significant in the eyes of the Israeli polity. Likud
was "dedicated to the integration of the historic
Land of Israel."'·' The new Likud government
worked with Gush Emunim to maximize Israel's
de facto control over the territories. In fact, the
Likud's settlement patterns "were meant to
establish facts which would make it diftlcult for any
government to withdraw from the West Bank."""
This change in direction was possible because the
election mandate did not proscribe it.
The public's ambivalence prompted Likud to
institutionalize its policies in November 1981 with
Military Order 949, which called for a "civil"
administration in the occupied territories. The plan
also called for more Palestinian participation in
local affairs, but the "civilian" administrator was
actually a reserve army officer who replaced
incompliant Palestinian municipal councils with
Israeli army officers. These' new Likud policies led
to censorship of pro-PLO newspapers; increased
expulsions, home demolitions, and curfews; seizures of property; and imprisonments without trial.
The new civil administration also closed Bethlehem, an-Najah, Hebron, and Bir Zeit universities
"for weeks or months at a time."(,[
That Likud policies became entrenched is clear
from the principles adopted by the 1984 National

New Likud policies led to
censorship of pro- PLO
newspapers; increased
expulsions, home
demolitions, and curfews;
seizures of property;
and imprisonments
without trial.
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Unit\' Government, a Labor-Likud coalition. The
agreement "guaranteed inaction on the issue that
was most crucial, the future of the \\'est Bank and
Gaza, \vhere the status quo \vas to be maintained:
no annexation and no change in sovereignty,"'"
t.Ioreover, the settlement program was to continue,
and the new government even "thickened" existing
settlements to allow the Jewish population of the
territories to continue growing.";
The principles of the 1984 National l' nit\
Government show the ambiguity of the Israeli
political system-and of Israeli political partiestowards the occupied territories, This ambiguity
resulted from the position of Sephardic .Je\\'s, the
actions of religious groups like Gush Emunim,
and the uncertainty of the Israeli public towards
democratic principles. All this, in turn, contributed
to the entrenchment of the dual value system in
Israel's policies towards the occupied territories.
TilE IsR,\ELI C()t\TR()L SYSTFJ\I

The natural result of the dual \'alue s,'stem's
injection into Israel's policies is a control system that
infringes on the rights of the Palestinian population
in the occupied territories. Baruch Kimmerling defines a "control sl'stem"
as a territorial entity compnsl11g several subcollectivities, held together lw purelY militan'
and police forces and their civil extensions (e.g.,
bureaucracies and settlers). \\'hen the "tleld
of power" is much larger than the "field of
authority," a control S\'stem is formed. These
subcollectivities are stratified according to their
abilit\' to gain access to force, political power
and diverse rights, but mostly according to the
shared benetlts of the entire s\'stem. Am'
situation of armed occupation (but no more
than that) is a temporan' control system. The
central component differentiating between
situations such as internal colonialism, deeph'
divided societies, the Soviet "satellite" sYStem,
slave-based societies, etc., and the control
system is the ruling sector's virtually total lack
of interest and ability in creating a common
identit\' or basic value system to legitimize its
use of violence to maintain the system, or in
developing other kinds of loyalties toward
force and power.'"
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The purpose of the control S\'stem is to either
keep Palestinians down or to drive them out,
with the ultimate goal of preventing them from
challenging Israel for control of the land. The
Israeli control system does this by making the
economy of the occupied territories dependent
upon that of Israel,''' b\' using force to quell
Palestinian resistance to the occupation, and by
making li\'ing conditions unbearable to Palestinians. As ;\Iexander Flores points out, "an often
voiced suspicion is that Ithese restrictions I are
geared to make life unbearable for the Palestinian
inhabitants and to make as many of them emigrate
as possible."""
In Israel, the control S\'stem has tlowed from
the existence of the dual value S\'stem, but only in
conjunction with the Israeli political system. The
Israeli polity has demonstrated its willingness to
allow for a double standard in dealing with
Palestinians, despite Israel's ideals of democracy
and the desire of the Israeli polin' to achieve all
three of its national goals. This is how the dual
\'alue S\'stem that developed in Israel after 1967
resulted in the control S\'stem. In its turn, this
control S\'stem has resulted in s}'stematic human
rights abuses because the entrenchment of the
dual value s\'stem turned discriminatory ideas into
discriminaton' action.
These sntematic abuses include Israel's
"Judaization" polin' in Jerusalem, the settlement
program, administrative methods of control, and
Israel's response to the illtijtlda. Israeli actions vis-avis the Palestinians demonstrate how the extension
of the tield of power beyond the tield of authorit\,
-i.e., the implementation of the dual value
system-has led to S\'stematic human rights abuses
in the \\'est Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967.
TI.If.l"daizatio/l 0l.Jemsa!elll. Israel's policy in East
Jerusalem is to encourage Palestinians to leave,
while establishing a Jewish majority there. This
discriminatory polin' was evident from the beginning of Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem.
After the 1967 war, the Israeli government
"[expanded] the municipal boundaries of the
city to include as much land as possible and to
exclude as much of the Palestinian population as
possible."'·- Israel also extended "full Israeli law and
administration" to East Jerusalem, though it did not
offer the area's Palestinian inhabitants citizenship

or passports:" Today, the dual value S\'stem has
become fused with the control system in Israel's
Jerusalem policies. Anat Hoffman, a member of
the Jerusalem City Council, wrote in 1995:
Continuing discrimination against Arabs IS
ingrained in Jerusalem's political culture, a sort
of accepted blemish we are trained to see and
overlook. It characterizes the workings of this
city in ever}' walk of life, ranging from the
macro to the minute. !\Iv tile cabinets are
literally overtlowing with examples in every
sphere: emplovment, economics, taxation,
housing, construction, education, cit\' planning, welfare, health, roads, buses, sewerage,
street lights.""
Israel's attempt to Judaize Jerusalem is clear.
For instance, Palestinians own 85 to 90 percent of
land in East Jerusalem, though only a fraction
of this land is zoned for residential building.-" Of
the 7S,OOO dunums annexed to Jerusalem in 1967,
Israel has expropriated 2S,000 to build new Jewish
neighborhoods.- ' The Israeli government has only
designated 7,SO() dunums of Arab land as residential. Also, from 1967 to
1994, the Jewish population
of East Jerusalem grew by
204,2UO, while the Arab
population grew bv 96,300.
However, 64,800 new housing units were built for
Jews (or one unit for every
3.15 Jewish residents) and
8,800 for Arabs (or one
unit for every 10.9 Arab
inhabitants). In East Jerusalem, 87.5 percent of
Jewish settlers "live in
housing conditions of one
or fewer persons per room,
whereas only 33.4 percent of the Arabs live in such
conditions." The object of providing more
housing for Jews than for Arabs in East Jerusalem
is to make the Palestinians feel crowded enough
to leave the city altogether, making way for the
further Judaization of Jerusalem.- 2
T/.if Jettie1JJeI!t Prqrz,Tam. The purpose of Israel's
settlement policy has been to prevent the

The object of providing
more housing for Jews
than Arabs in East
Jerusalem is to make the
Palestinians feel crowded
enough to leave the city
altogether, making way
for the further Judaizacion of Jerusalem.
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Palestinian population from challenging Israel for
control of the occupied territories. \X'ith its settlement program, Israel has gained exclusive control
over more than 6() percent of the \Vest Bank and
40 percent of the Gaza Strip." The discriminatory
nature of the settlements is obvious, but especially
so in Gaza, where 3,500 settlers in 16 settlements
occupy 5,56() acres of land, while 300,O()() Palestinian refugees in eight camps live on 1,375 acres.-'
The distribution of water in the occupied
territories is also discriminator\". Settlers use three
times as much water per head as do Arabs in the
\X'est Bank (thirteen times as much when it comes
to agriculture), and Israel has frozen Palestinians'
water consumption, though it has placed no such
restrictions on settlers.-'
J\1oreover, Israel has expropriated l\rab-owned
land on a large scale in order to support settlements. In Ma\' 1997 alone, the government contlscated 7,OOU acres of Palestinian land in order to
expand both settlements and the by-pass roads
leading to them.-' Expropriating land also deprives
Palestinians of their agricultural livelihoods, further depressing the economy of the occupied territories and making Palestinians' living conditions
less desirable.-"
Adlllini.r/ratilJf i\1etbodr of Control. Israeli control
methods have also resulted in circumstances that
worsen Palestinians' standard of living and keep
them economically and politically unable to challenge Israel's control (wer the occupied territories.
Israel forbids Palestinian workers from staying
overnight in Israel and issues "work permits to
control the flow of labour," further emphasizing
the separate political and economic status of
Palestinians from the territories.-- In an effort to
solidify Israel's de facto control over the territories,
Israeli oftlcials have set frequent curfews, seized
property, imprisoned Palestinians without trial, sent
workers home without pay, jammed Palestinian
radio broadcasts, and sealed the borders of the
territories so workers could not get to work.-~ The
IDF has also "detained thousands of suspects
without charge or trial. ... The detainees, however,
[have] had no right to learn the reasons for
the government's suspicion, but [have borne] the
burden of disproving them to gain release."-"
I.rrae/:r Respome to the Intifada. The in/ijclria was
the general Palestinian uprising against Israel's
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occupation of the occupied territories that lasted
from late 19R7 to 1993. I srae]'s response to the
in/ijilda involved some of the most obvious cases of
human rights abuses since the occupation of the
\Vest Bank and Gaza in 1%7.
In 1987, Israel became the tlrst lT~ memberstate to officially sanction torture b\' limiting
torture to "a moderate amount of force" and
"non-violent ps\'chological pressure." HO\\'ever, "a
handful of prisoners have subsequently died under
interrogation."'" During the ill/ijilda, "commonh'
used torture techniques included beatings, electrical shock, keeping a tight-fitting hood over a person's head for long periods, sleep depri,-ation, and
tying a person's hands to a bar behind the person's
back, making standing impossible.""
On .lanuan 19, 1988, Defense J\[inister Yitzhak
Rabin announced a policy of "might, power, and
beatings" to counter the Palestinian uprising." After
the announcement of this polin°, "hundreds of
Palestinians were 'methodicall\" beaten, man\" with
the bones of their hands and arms broken.""
Minority Rights Group International reports, "B,'
the end of 1991, O\-er 1,000 Palestinians had been
killed by shootings, beatings, tear gas or some other
means. Over a quarter of those who died were
under 16. Another lOO,(J()(J suffered serious injuries,
while over 15,O()() were held without trial for at least
six months.""
All of the control methods that Israel employed to counter the illtijclda were in addition to
those already in place for controlling the occupied
territories. After mid-1992, when the illti/ada was
already in decline, cases of s\-stematic torture,
interrogation, and beatings decreased in both
number and intensity." However, this reduction
was due to the effectiveness of alt-ead\' existing
control methods (such as economic repreSSIOn,
administrative methods of control, and home
demolitions) and the weakening of Palestinian
resistance to the military occupation.
The purpose of the control s\'Stem is to
maintain a de facto annexation of the occupied
territories while not actualh- making them officiall\'
part of Israel. To do this, the control s\"Stem uses
the methods of control I have outlined to keep
Palestinians in the territories economicalh- and
politically depressed and to encourage them to
emigrate from the land. Though the methods
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change over time, the purpose and underlying
design of the control ,\'stem femain essentialk
unchanged. During times of stiff popular resistance, as during the illtij{Ida, Israel employs stiff
methods of control, such as severe beatings, school
closings, and arcane torture methods. \X'hen the
indigenous population is more docile, it is not
necessaf\' for the Israeli occupiers to be overtly
coercive, and they emplO\' more subtle means of
control, such as home demolitions, roadblocks,
and the manipulation of building licenses. In both
cases, the purpose of the control system is the
same: keep Palestinians down or out in order to
perpetuate lsraeli control over the \X'est Bank and
Gaza Strip.

Human rights abuses in the \Vest Bank and
Gaza have occurred as a result of the entrenchment of a dual value system in Israel's
control structure. Therefore, Israel has two options
if it wants to end-Of signitlcanth' diminish, in am'
event-its human rights abuses in the occupied
territories.
The first choice is for Israel to maintain its dual
value s\'stem but eliminate its control system. In
other words, Israel would withdraw from the
territories, because the control sYstem depends on
a field of power that is larger than the field of
authority, which IS inherent in any military
occupation. This option would not require Israel
to modify its double standard with respect to
Palestinians, even though-over time-this ma\'
be the result. At the same time, this option would
require Israel to modify its national goals somewhat, for it could not be a state extending across all
of Eretz Israel if it withdrew from the West Bank
and Gaza, though it could still maintain a democracy within its new borders, as well as its
Je,vishness.
The second choice for Israel is to eliminate the
dual value s\'stem altogether, b~' which it would
offer equal political rights to Palestinians in the
occupied territories. However, Israel would thus
risk losing its Jewish identity, and it still might not
have de facto control over all the Land of IsraeL
Even so, it would effectively eliminate human
rights violations by raising Palestinians to the same
civil and political level that Israeli Jews enjoy. The

Law of Return (1950) grants all Jews, no matter
where the\' live in the world, the right to Israeli
citizenship. In late 1999, the Knesset debated a bill
that would declare the Law of Return discriminatory, because it does not offer non-Jews the same
right. Zehava Gal-on, a member of the Knesset
from the leftist Meretz Part\', said during the
debate, "The Law of Return is discriminatory. It
discriminates between Jews and non-Jews. I can
accept that after the Holocaust, it was kind of a
necessity. But maybe after 51 years, we are not in
the same situation, and we don't need to run our
countf\' based on such undemocratic laws.'"'' At
the same time, Prime Minister Ehud Barak vowed
to ne\'er discuss the law-much less amend itduring his term, which makes it unlikely that Israel
will officially modif\, its dual value S\'stem any time
soon.'- The fact that a Jewish MI"';: would even
challenge the law, though, is a step towards
eliminating the double standard between Jews and
Palestinians.
\X'ith either option, Israel must compromise on
its national goals. Thus, the dilemma that Israelis
have faced since 1967 remains unchanged. Who
are the\', and which of their national goals are they
willing to give up?
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BRYAN FISHER
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n December 2(), 1989, United States forces
consisting of 12,()()() soldiers invaded Panama
to remove General Manuel Noriega from power.
Almost two weeks later, Noriega abandoned his
refuge in the Vatican Embassy in Panama City and
was apprehended by u.s. authorities and transported to Florida to face charges of drug trafficking. Operation Just Cause, as the military action
was called, became the largest U.S. military combat
operation since the Vietnam \Xiar, costing the lives
of twenty-six Americans and more than seven
hundred Panamanians.' The V.S. invasion and subsequent month-long occupation of Panama drew
broad criticism from the international communit\'.
Both the United Nations and the Organization of
American States (OAS) voted to condemn the
United States's action.'
This article will show that the United States's
invasion of Panama violated international law. The
mission to remove Noriega was illegal, violating
the principles of noninterference under the charters of the United Nations and the Organization
of American States. The invasion also contra-

O

vened the customary international law principle of
territorial sovereignty. Circumstances surrounding
the conflict did not warrant U.S. intervention in
self-defense. The four objectives of Operation
Just Cause offered by the Bush administration as
a rationale for the invasion have a limited foundation in international law and do not constitute sufficient legal justification for breaching Panamanian sovereignty.
An examination of the relationship between
Noriega and the United States prior to the invasion will allow for analysis of the U.S. position.
General Noriega had risen to the command of
Panama's National Guard and become the de
facto leader of Panama in 1981 after the death of
Omar Torrijos, Panama's dictatorial leader since
1968. In the mid-1980s, Noriega helped the CIA
gather information on Cuba as a paid informant \
and allowed the United States to use Panama as
a platform for military operations in Central
America: For years, the Reagan administration
conveniently ignored evidence of Noriega's drug
trafficking activities, but Noriega lost U.S. support
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when it was discovered that he had aided the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and other rebels in
Colombia and EI Salvador. In februan 19H8, a C.S.
federal grand jury indicted Noriega on charges of
drug trafficking and conspiracy to import marijuana
to the Cnited States. In
attempts to oust the
dictator, the Reagan administration tlrst offered
asylum to ~oriega in
Europe and then placed
economic sanctions on
Panama. All such efforts
failed, including diplomatic pressure through
the OAS and further
economic pressures.' In
;\Ia\- 1989, Noriega annulled the results of Panama's national election.
After a failed coup attempt by Panamanian rebels
against Noriega in October, the L.S. "intensified its
verbal attacks on Noriega, thereby further painting
itself into a corner," in effect committing itself to
remove Noriega." On December 15, the Panamanian legislature declared war on the United States
because of the economic sanctions and extended
additional powers to Noriega, naming him
"Maximum Leader." The Bush administration did
not appear to immediately take these measures as
a serious threat.- In fWO separate incidents the
following day, however, Panamanian soldiers first
shot and killed an off-duty U.S. Marine oHicer and
then beat a Navy officer and threatened his wife.'
After years of increasing tensions between the
enited States and Panama, these last events
triggered a response from the Bush administration
in the form of a large-scale military invasion.
Called by one official "a decision in search of an
excuse,""' the administration took full advantage of
an opportunity for a highly publicized battle in the
"war on drugs," portraying Noriega as a vengeful,
narcotic-trafficking dictator who would ruthlessly
murder U.S. servicemen. On December 20, just
hours after U.S. forces entered Panama, President
Bush declared in a public statement that Noriega's
"reckless threats and attacks [had] created an
imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens
in Panama."'" The President gave four objectives
for the military intervention, for which he later
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claimed success when Noriega was taken into
custody: (1) to safeguard the lives of American
citizens, (2) tf) help restore democran-, (.0,) to
protect the integrit\· of the Panama Canal Treaties,
and (4) to bring Noriega to justice. According
to President Bush, ()peration Just Cause was
"consistent '.vith political, diplomatic and moral
principles.""
Secretary of State James Baker used Article 51
of the United ~ations Charter and Article 21 of
the Organization of American States Charter
to justify the inten'ention of the l- nited States
in Panama under the principle of self-defense."
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessan'
to maintain international peace and securit\-.'
Article 21 of the OAS Charter reads:
The American States bind themseh-es in their
international relations not to have recourse to
the use of force, except in the case of selfdefense in accordance with existing treaties or
in fulfillment thereof."
The United States's argument asserted that it
could legally intervene in self-defense to protect its
citizens in Panama, but this position intentionalhneglected vital principles of international law. The
customan- international law principle of selfdefense, formalized in the OAS and LN charters,
has specitic requirements in its application to the
protection of nationab abroad:
There must be (1) an imminent threat of injunto nationals, (2) a failure or inability on the part
of the territorial sovereign to protect them and
(3) measures of protection strictly confined to
the object of protecting them against injun-.
Even under customary- law onh-. an absolute
necessity could justify an intervention to
protect nationals."
Customary international law also dictates that a
militan- response in self-defense must comply with
the principle of proportionalit\-: the response must
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he proportional to the threat. Further, rescue
missions should not he tainted h,' ulterior motives.'" These self·defense prereLluisites are not
mere formalities or optional guidelines to he dismissed and forgotten; thn' are necessan' safeguards against serious, unwarranted violations of
national sO\'Creignt\".
Conditions in Panama in December 1989 did
not satisf\" the above legal requirements for
l'.S. inten-ention in self-defense. Given the circumstances of Panama's "declaration of war" on
the United States and the two attacks on r\merican
citizens, the Bush administration could assume at
worst that the atmosphere in Panama had become
hostile toward Americans and that the Panamanian government could not be trusted to protect
American nationals. \'{'hether or not the threat
against Americans in Panama was truly imminent
remains a Yen' debatable question. ~o further
harm came to Americans in the three da\'s preceding the invasion. While Noriega offered no
apology for the December 16 attacks, the degree
of his responsibility for those incidents was truly
unknown.
ror the U.S. president to take no action
whatsoever to protect the Americans in Panama
would have been irresponsible. Even so, the Bush
administration had great difficulty demonstrating
the absolute necessity of its chosen actions. Several
options short of an illegal, full-scale invasion
remained available. Alternative courses of action in
ending the threat to U.S. nationals ranged from the
diplomatic, such as pressure from within the UN or
OAS, to displa,-s of strength such as positioning
carrier groups off the Panamanian coast."
In addition to the problems of imminence and
necessity that the United States's argument faced,
the U.S. could hareU\" call its response proportional.
The two violent incidents and death of a single
American pale in comparison with the loss of more
than seven hundred Panamanian lives, extensive
property damage, and occupation by U.S. forces
for over a month. Furthermore, from the stated
objectives of Operation Just Cause, the United
States's motives extended far beyond the protection
of its nationals.
While the U.S. attempted to justify its actions
under Articles 51 of the UN Charter and 21 of the
OAS Charter, those articles in fact constitute an

exception (self-defense) to the rule. The rule of
noninterference applies generally. This principle is
also coditied in the UN and OAS charters. Article 2,
section 4 of the UN Charter proclaims, "All
Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of
any state.""
Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter further
bind the United States:
No State ... has the right to intervene, directly
o[ indirectly, for any reason whatever, in
the internal or external affairs of am' other
State. The foregoing principle prohibits not
onl\". armed force but also any. other form of
interference or attempted threat against the
personality of the State or against its political,
economic, and cultural elements. . . . The
territor\" of a State is inviolable; it ma,' not
be the object, even temporarily, of military
occupation or of other measures of force
taken b\' another State.'"
Insofar as the U.S. cannot justify its invasion of
Panama under the guise of self-defense, the invasion is illegal under these treaties. An\" standard
by which Operation Just Cause would not be
considered a use of force against the territorial
initegrity of Panama ,-______________________
would be ridiculous
and
useless
for
general application
in internationalla~:2"
A foreign military
presence of such
duration and devastating impact as that
of Operation Just
Cause and the remc)\"al of the de facto ruler clearly constitute
interference with the personality and political
elements of the state and a violation of its
territory. Consequently, international law did not
support the measures taken by the Bush administration to "safeguard the lives of Americans" in
Panama. The first of the four justifications for the
U.S. invasion is invalid.
The other three U.S. justitications have even
less legal foundation. "Restoration of democracy,"

Regardless of the criminal
charges against Noriega,
an extraterritorial U.S. law
enforcement arrest breaks
international law by violating Panama's sovereignty.
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the second US. objective, may appear to be a noble
cause from the American perspective but has a
very weak base in international law. (Incidentalh',
the language "restoration of democracy" is d~
ceptive in that there had been no true liberal
democracy in Panama in the past twenty-one ,'ears
since Omar Torrijos first came to power. Apparently, the United States waited to act on behalf of the people of Panama until intervention
sen'ed its own interests.) \'Vhen seen in the light
of humanitarian intervention against a repressive
dictator, Operation Just Cause still has insufficient justification. 2] The principle of humanitarian
inten-ention is a developing concept in international law, but as of 19H9 it certainh- was not
generally accepted. W'orldwide condemnation of
the US. invasion illustrates this point well. The
1994 intervention in Haiti was the landmark case
supporting the concept of humanitarian intervention, as the UN authorized the use of force to
implement democratic elections following Haiti's
military COUp.22 Five years earlier this precedent
had not ,-et been set, and even if it had, the U.S.
lacked the eN authorization it had in the case of
Haiti.
A related argument for restoring democracy is
curioush· derived from the customary international
law principle of self-determination, asserting that
a countrv has greater opportunities for selfdetermination under a democratic government."
Questions of self-determination, hm.vever, are
more relevant when a nation is subject to the
extended influence and intervention of a foreign
power. In the case of Panama, the greatest threat
to its self-determination obviously came from the
United States when Noriega was captured. Restoration of democracy is not an adequate legal
defense for Operation Just Cause.
"To protect the integrity of the Panama Canal
Treaties" was the US. mission's third objective, but
Noriega never physically threatened either the
treaties or US. control of the Canal Zone. In fact,
the treaties protected Panama from U.S. intervention. While the treaties provided for both
countries' "right to defend the canal against any
aggression or threat directed against the Canal,"
they also expressh' defended Panama against the
threat of US. intervention:
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This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted
as, a right of intervention of the United States
in the internal afL'lirs of Panama. AnI' United
States action will be directed at insuring that
the Canal will remain open, secure, and accessible, and it shall never be directed against the
territorial integrity or political independence of
Panama. 24
Ironically, in a supposed eHort to protect the
Panama Canal Treaties, the United States violated
them.
The ES. invasion accomplished its fourth
objective of capturing General Noriega. Although
"the United States has demonstrated an increasing
willingness to extend the reach of its la\\· enforcement in foreign countries," the actions taken
by LS. forces to apprehend Noriega violated
international law." enited States domestic law has
jurisdiction onlv within the borders of its territory. The protecti,'e principle is an exception to
that rule, extending IT.S. jurisdiction O\'erseas
to conduct that directl" affects the functions or
actions of the L.S. government. L nder protective jurisdiction, thc L.S. could legally have
taken Noriega into CllstOlh, had the Panamanian
government authorized the presence of LS.
forces. Of course, Noriega was at the head of the
Panamanian government, so the L.S. neither asked
permission nor received Panama's authorization
to deploY U.S. troops on Panamanian territory.
Regardless of the criminal charges against ~oriega,
extraterritorial U.S. law enforcement arrest breaks
international law by violating Panama's territorial
sovereignty.
Despite the fact that it would hm-e "virtually no
impact" on drug shipments to the United States,
the Bush administration called Operation Just
Cause a success."· General ~oriega was tried and
convicted on eight counts of racketeering, drug
trafficking, and mone,' laundering, and received a
sentence of forty years in a US, penitentiary,
(Questions of the legality of his trial reside outside
the scope of this paper, which focuses exclusively
on the legality of the US. invasion.) No furthe'r
harm came to U.S. nationals in Panama, and the
supposed threats against the integrity of the Canal
Treaties did not materialize. President Endara,
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elected in Panama's annulled elections of l\lm'
1Sl89, took office at the head of government just
over a week after the invasion began. Subsequent
Panamanian presidents hm'C also been democratically elected. Perhaps some feel that these ends
sef\'e as justification for illegal means.
As mentioned earlier, the United States did not
go unreprimanded for invading Panama. But even
the nearly universal condemnations were no harsh
punishment for a nation as powerful as the US.
In conclusion, the stated objectives of Operation Just Cause intentionall\' misinterpret international law principles in order to justify the
Cnited States's im'asion of Panama and removal of
its de facto leader. The l' nited States could not
offer sufficient grounds for its actions in "selfdefense" or for extending the jurisdiction of its
m,vn laws to Panamanian soil. Humanitarian justifications portray the breach of Panama's territorial
sovereignty as morally correct, but these justifications cannot legitimize US. interference in Panamanian sovereignt\· and self,determination. In spite
of ostensibk honorable intentions, the operation
was illegal.
Sadly, Operation Just Cause IS one of
numerous liS interventions in the relatively weak
nations of Latin America. The meager political
consequences of the 1985l invasion of Panama will
not deter the US. from taking similar action in the
future when US. interests appear to be at stake.
The invasion certainly did nothing to improve the
United States's long-standing reputation as a bulk
~or did it strengthen the relevance of international
law in general. \X'hat is international law worth and
how can it provide for justice among nations if it
can be so easily twisted and ignored? Either the
Bush administration failed to consider these
negative consequences of illegal intervention, or
simply deemed them acceptable in light of
Administration objectives. In an\' case, they surely
sensed the Irony in the name that was itself
an excuse anticipating torrents of criticism:
"Operation Just Cause."
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cholarly literature on international women's
rights abounds with qualitative case studies and
international law research but neglects quantitative
supported studies for a number of reasons. First,
obtaining data across a large enough section of
states in order to give a substantially cross-national
base is difficult. Second, data-gathering bodies
often fail to collect and report specifically genderrelated measures. Finally, cross-national studies
are cross-cultural as well; culture is difficult to
quantify, greatly impeding past research.
Although cultural difference creates a sIgnificant barrier for quantitative research, recent
improvements in raw data allow us to better
anah-ze the factors that lead to women's human
rights violations.' Cross-national quantitative
studies have helped scholars identify and measure
these factors. To further the findings of these
scholars, I employ a similar model, compiling
,-arious hypotheses and testing them statistically.
I use this method to explore the relationship

S

between gender economIc equalit\· and such
variables as economic development, the level of
democracy, female literacy rate, women's political
participation, and reproductive rights. Conventional wisdom and hints from previous studies,
rather than any specific theoretical basis, lead me
to assume the importance of these factors. This
area of study is still in its infancy; examining the
effect of many variables will provide a basis for
theoretical understanding that can lead to more
focused, rigorous studies.
PREVJ( lCS STl'DIES

Several empirical studies, though not specifically addressing human rights issues, show which
difterent aspects of women's rights scholars have
examined. Clark (1991), Semyonov (1980), and
Semyonov and Shenhav (1988) look at labor
force participation by women across countries. The
United Nations (1992) has done research that deals
with the proportion of women in decision-making
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jobs. Sen (19R7) and Basu (1992) look more
generally at the CJualit\· of life of women. /\nd
finally, Nader (198(l) looks at cross-national
systems of male dominance over women.'
Clair Apodaca (1998) focuses more on \VOmen's human rights and creates the index on

The study- most closely related to mine is b\Poe, \X'endel-Blunt, and Ho (1997) in which thn'
formulate t\\'O cross-national measures for the year
1993: one deals with women's political equalit\" the
other \\'ith economic equality, The\' look at some

women's economic and social rights (\\,ESHR),
which measures differences between male and
female rights regarding work, the standard of living,
health and well-being, and education.; She uses this
index to look at how economic development affects
the realization of women's economic and social

le\'el of development and then correlate the scores
with GNP per capita, The\' find it to be significant,
though it is only a bivariate (t\vo-\'ariable) test.
While the\, intend to look at this relationship in
more detail in the future, the\, have made their
scores publicl\' a\'ailable. I plan to use their measure
of women's economic equality as the dependent
variable in nw study, responding to their "hope that
ltheir scoresJ will be helpful to others who wish to
do research in this area,"'"

rights by region. She finds that economic de\'elopment leads to greater realization of these rights and
that as development increases, women's share of
the prosperity also increases.' S. Laurel \,{'eldon
(1999) examines cross-national government responsiveness to violence against women, concluding that strong autonomous women's movements
and their links to an effective women's policy
bureaucracy or other government insider most
determine if and how a government deals with
battered women issues.'
Finally, four other studies are closely related to
my research. The first is a simple analysis of some
factors that hypothetically might affect human
rights conditions in states, such as the type
of regime, the type of colonial past, level of
development, and the level of trade with capitalist
states." Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate and
~eith (1999) do two much more rigorous studies,
building on Mitchell and ~lcCormick, in which
they examine a number of factors that they
hypothesize ma\' affect human rights dealing with
violation of personal integrity: level of democracy,
population size, rate of population change, economic standing, rate of economic growth, presence of a leftist government, military control,
British cultural intluence, international war, and
civil war.- The difference between their two studies
is the number of years and 'the countries that they
examine. The\' find that civil war is the strongest
factor that contributes to violations of personal
integrity. Interestingly, this change alters some of
the conclusions about the causes of personal
integrity abuse.' Economic development, democracy, population size, economic standing, and
international war were also substantially significant
factors.
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descriptive properties of the scores by region and
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To contribute to the continuing ettort to
illuminate causes of the denial of human rights
to women in various countries, I build a crosssectional multivariate linear model that regresses
the level of women's economic equality in 1993 on
several uther variables. The model is essentialh
built following the process used b,' Poe, Tate, and
I,eith," which is based on Blalock's Theory
Construction (1969)," In this system, the research
compiles various h\'potheses, then inserts them
into a theory-driven model that is estimated
mathematically,
Various international documents define
women's economic rights, the dependent variable
in m\, stud\,. The Uni\'ersaI Declaration on Human
Rights is generally accepted as the ultimate human
rights standard against which countries should be
judged. It declares in Article 23, section 1, that
"everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment" and in section 2, that "everyone,
without am discrimination, has the right to equal
pay for equal worL"" In addition, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
mandates that women's "conditions of work are
not inferior to those enjoyed by men" and that
women are entitled to eCJual pay for equal work,"
Using these declarations as a guide, Poe, \VendelBlunt, and Ho code State Department reports for
the year 1993 for 174 countries, The scale ranges
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the lowest level of

Table 1. Scale I 'sed to Produce \X'omen's I':conomic Rights Countn Scores (Poe Score)
S( (au

\'CII\T TilE

S( '( lRI·.

II\:DIC\TES

1

No la\\'S exist that guarantee eLJual rights In the workplace or equal pal' for equal work Sexual economIC
discrimination is practiced and acccpted lw most of the population.

2

Laws apparentl\' prohibit sexual discrimination and guarantee eClual pay for equal work Sexual discrimination
is practiced lw most and there are no serious governmental efforts to improvc the situation,

i

Laws prohibit sexual discrimination and guarantee eLJual pal' for eLJual \\'C)rk Some sexual economIc
discrimination is practiced but no longer accepted b\' most of the population, Serious government efforts arc
undcr wa\' to fight discrimination and ensure equal par

-l

Laws prohibit scxual discrimination and guarantee eLJual pm' for equal work Discrimination IS no longer
acccpted I1\' most of the population and is therefore no longer a serious social problem,

economic equalit\, and 4 representing the highest.
To summarize the criteria for coding countries,
refer to Table 1,
The Poe score is designed as an indicator of
actual social and governmental attitudes towards
women's economic rights, This is probably one of
the best ways to measure such rights since women's
equality is most closely linked to preYailing societal
attitudes. Therefore, the researcher can use virtually am "facts on the ground" as independent
variables without these being included in the
score for the dependent variable, unless they deal
specifically with laws and practices of economic
discrimination. I t is important to note that this is
an ordinal scale with discrete values. There really
exists no in-between score such as two or three. \'V'e
\\,ill assume, however, for the purposes of this
study that this is interval-level data that runs
continuously between 1 and 4.
J\l\' first independent variable is level of economic development, measured h· gross national
product (GNP) per capita for each country in
1991. 1 • Poe, Tate and Keith; Poe, Wendel-Blunt
and Ho; and Apodaca all find economic development to be an important factor in human rights
in general and women's rights in particular. I include it because it is necessary to control for this
variable and substantiate or refute these previous
studies. I h\lx,thesize that economic development
will increase the women's economic equality
score.
Past studies validate this hypothesized
relationship. Economic development, scholars
reason, liberates women from the rural lifestyle in

which husbands and fathers often dominate
them. I" The dissemination of information through
technology exposes women to arguments for
economic equality, which then leads them to
change the status quo. This reasoning, however,
goes against some conventional wisdom that
economic development is detrimental to human
rights. for this reason, we need to distinguish
between level and rate of development. Scholars
have shown that it is the rate of growth that often
leads to more oppression while a higher level of
development contributes to recognition of human
rights. 1The second independent variable is the level of
democracy. In more democratic nations (ones that
give the vote to women, for example) women have
more opportunit\· to express dissatisfaction with
their economic condition and to work for change
that will improve their position. The measure for
democracy will be a composite of the Freedom
House (Gas til) civil and political freedom scores
for the \'ear 1993-94. 1' This composite score is
following the example of Burkhart and LewisBeck, who use it to cover the full range of variance
in democracy-both civil and political. I" For other
usage of the Gastil measure, see Poe and Tate. 211
I hypothesize that as the level of democracy
increases, economic rights will also increase. 1 have
not reversed the scale as Burkhart did, though, so
we would expect that as the Freedom House score
decreases, the Poe score will increase.
The next independent variable has to do with
reproductive rights. 1\ prevalent argument deals
with the question of whether reproductive rights
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WOMEN'S ECONOMIC EQUALITY
Table 2. Variable Operationalizations
I/ariable

Operaliollalizalioll

Women's Economic

Four-point oretinal measure of economic equality in 1-993 provided by Poe, Wendel-Blunt, and Ho

Equality

(1 = least economic equality; 4 = most economic equality)

Economic De,·elopment

GNP per capita in 1991

Level of Democrac),

Freedom House composite democracy score in 1993 (2 = mOst democracy; 14 = least democracy)

Reproductive Rights

Percentage of married women of reproductive age who are using modern contraception in 1990

Women's Political Participation
Female Literacy Rate

Percentage of seats held bl' women

are a necessary prerequisite to women's economic
rights.2I I contend that they are. As women gain
substantive reproductive rights, they are then able
to control how many children they have and when
they have them. This allows them to attend school
more readily and continuously, leading to informed
attitudes about rights among women and more
mobility in the domestic women's movement. To
measure this variable, I use the percentage of
married women who are using modern contraception (as opposed to traditional contraceptive
methods) in 1990. 22 This is a proxy variable: higher
level of use of modern contraceptives may not
necessarily indicate a higher level of reproductive
rights. It is therefore not an ideal measure, but
scholars have used it in the past. 23 A higher level of
reproductive rights (modern contraceptive use) will
lead to an increase in the economic equality scale.
Women's political participation will also lead to
increases in economic rights. As the proportion of
women in government increases, the discourse
about women's rights in government will increase
and voting power for women's rights advocates in
legislative bodies will increase. I measure political
participation as the percentage of women in
representative governmental positions in a given
country in 1992. 24 As women's political participation increases, the women's economic equality score
will increase.
Finally, female literacy rate also plays a role
in women's economic rights. As women become
more literate, they are better able to tap into
resources that educate them about their rights.
Education leads to activism and mass mobilization,
which leads to change in economic and political
rights. Where there are great amounts of literacy,
women will be more informed about their options
and, therefore, will act to procure them. The
measure for this variable is the female adult literacy
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in 1992

Percentage of adult female litetacy in 1994

rate for each country in 1994. 25 We expect, therefore, that as female adult literacy increases, the
women's economic equality score will also increase.
The linear multivariate model for 1993 1n
equation form is as follows:
Women's Economic Equality;
~ 1 + ~2
Economic Development; + ~3 Level of
Democracy; + ~4 Reproductive Rights; + ~ 5
Women's Political Participation; + ~6 Female
Literacy Rate; + V;
~l
intercept
~11
regression coefficient of variable n
~;
error term for country i

=

=
=
=

D ESCR1JYfIVE ANALYSIS

Only two countries (Australia and Norway) out
of the 174 achieve a women's economic equality
score of 4 (sexual economic discrimination is no
longer a real problem) . Not surprisingly, both
countries have a high level of human development,
being ranked number three and number thirteen
respectively on the Human Development Index
(HDI) , a ranking sys tem that considers life
expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, combined
school enrollment ratio, and adjusted per capita
income. 26 Of the 174 countries, 30 received a score
of 3 (indicating a serious effort by the government
to undermine economic discrimination and that
Chart 1. Poe Scaes for 174 Comtries

120
100
80
~rrb.rof

Countries

Poe Score

JOSHUA LLOYD
most of the population is supportive of those
efforts); 22 of these 30 countries have what is
considered a high human development,27 5 have a
medium human development and 2 have a low
human development (I was not able to ascertain
the level of human development of one of the
countries). This may indicate that it is not always
necessary for a country to have a highly developed
economy in order for it to have a relatively high
level of economic equality for women. The
overwhelming majority of states (104) have Poe
scores of 2. These are states that appear to have
women's rights in their discourse (they have laws
against economic discrimination on the books),
but they are not yet enforcing those laws.
Additionally, most of the population does not
accept economic equality by gender. The mean
score for economic rights overall is 1.98 with a
standard deviation of 0.67. Chart 1 demonstrates
the distribution of countries by score.
In performing the regression analysis, it is
important to remember that this scale is very small
(in terms of units) and so a small numerical change
represents a large societal change.
D ATA ANALYSIS

As already mentioned, the Poe score is regressed linearly on the listed independent variables.
The model is linear because at this point there is no
theoretical reason to suppose that the relationships
are quadratic, cubic, or otherwise. In order to
perform the regression with the variables that the
model outlined above requires, I had to reduce
the number of cases considered. One of the
advantages to the Poe score is that it includes
a sweeping view of cross-national women's
economic equality. Unfortunately, because of data
limitations I was only able to find data on all of the
Table 3. Breakdown of Sample Countries by Region
Rt;giol/

NlIllIber of COllI/tries

Western Europe and

17

North Ameri ca
Latin America

14

Africa

30

Asia

20

Eastern Europe

10

Caribbean

4

Middle East

5

Chart 2. Poe Scores for 66 Comtries

35
~

25 '
Number of 20

Countries

15

Poe Score

variables for 100 countries. The reduction in the
number of cases is disappointing, for it limits
the conclusions that we can draw on a crossnational basis. Instead of drawing conclusions
based on all of the countries, I will be basing
mine on a smaller number.
The qualitative aspects of the countries in
question, in addition to the limit in the number of
cases, are also important. Fortunately the distribution of countries in different levels of development and region is similar to the full population.
Basing the divisions again on the HDI, there are
35 countries that rank high, 39 countries that rank
medium, and 26 countries that rank low. Regarding
region, there are 17 countries from Western Europe
and North America, 14 from Latin America, 30
from Africa, 20 from Asia, 10 from Eastern
Europe, 4 from the Caribbean, and 5 from the
Middle East (one of the hot spots when it comes to
women's rights issues) (see Table 3).
This sample includes 2 countries that score a 4;
23 countries with a score of 3; 59 countries with
a score of 2; and 16 with a score of 1. The distribution of the second, reduced sample is fairly
similar to that of all 174 countries. The sample
mean is 2.11 and the standard deviation is 0.68.
This is not the same as the full set of countries, but
it is fortunately not too far off and will have to
suffice. Chart 2 reflects this sample distribution.
The results of the corrected regression are
presented in Table 4, after correcting for
heteroscedasticity and recognizing the limitations
on the data. The female literacy rate and level of
women's reproductive rights did not exert a
statistically significant effect on the independent
variable. Nor did they exercise a jointly significant
effect, as demonstrated by an F-test. I took them
out of the model, therefore, and included the
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w( )n,m~'s Ec( )~( )J\IIC EQUAUTI'
Table 4. Corrected i\lodcl Results

Constant

2.11

<.1101"

(.1 "."

1.2.11)

.11001121

<.illll'

(.111111;

2.3H

-.1152

.i II 1.)*

(.111")

-3.0\

Women's ]>o!Jtical Participation

.024

<.1I0l +

(.1111(,)

goes up, the level of democrac,' in the country
diminishes). This is the directi'on indicated b~'
the h,'pothesis·: as democracy increases, so doe's
women's economic equality.
The last significant variable is women's political
participation. The results confirm the prediction
of the hypothesis that political participation b,"
women increases the level of economic equality
between genders. As the number of women in
parliament increases by lU percent, the economic
equality score also goes up by 0.24 points.

.1.(1l

1(111
R 'quare

results of the refitted model in Table 4. The
variables that exercised a significant effect were
the level of economic development, the level of
democracy, and women's political participation.
The R-square at the bottom of the table indicates
that these three variables account for 59 percent of
the variation in women's economic equality.
The results here substantiate previous studies'
findings about the positive relationship between
economic development and women's rights. As the
GNP per capita increases by ten thousand dollars
the women's economic equ~lity score will increas~
by 0.21 points. Given that the scale is only a fourpoint scale, a fifth of a point is quite sul~stantial.
An increase of ten thousand dollars in GNP per
capita, though, is also a \'Crv substantial increase. In
the sample, the country with the highest GNP per
capita in 1991 is Switzerland with $33,610; the
country with the lowest is Morocco with $80. It
would take decades, however, for a country to
increase its GNP per capita by ten thou~and
dollars. If we take the average GNP per capita of
the countries ($4965) and assume a constant annual
growth rate of 13.5 percent, the highest growth
rate of any of the countries in the sample, it would
take fifteen years for GNP per capita to increase b,'
that amount. This indicates that grmvth is a slo\~'
process and that change in women's economic
equality is relatively slow as well.
The second significant variable in the model is
the level of democracy. As the Freedom House
composite score increases by five points, women's economic equality goes down bv 0.25 points
(remember that as the Freedom House score
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This stud," substantiates previous studies that
have concluded that the level of economic
development in a country positively affects women's economic equality. In addition, 1 found that
two new variables positively intluence women's
economic equality: the level of democrao' and
the le\'cl of women's political participatio~ also
exercise statisticalh" significant effects on the
independent variable, thus supporting my originalh"
hypothesized relationships. This evidence is of
Immense importance for women's groups and
polio'makers at all levels because it imhcates
possible ways (working for economic de\'elopment,
promoting democrao', and putting women in
government) to positiveh' intluence women's rights.
The factors that 1 found to be insignificant are
perhaps more important in other areas of women\;
rights, particularly political rights. I did not
examine that here because the Poe score, the most
comprehensive measure, focuses on economic
rights. It would be interesting to construct a ne\\"
model to measure political rights.
This study represents a new step in the
quantitative study of international women's rights,
but it is onl" a beginning, Additional data must be
obtained on more countries in order to make a
comprehensive model of comparative women's
human rights (across nations, over time, and over
more variables). As governments make progress in
women's human rights, they will find more variance
across nations, allowing for more precise pmpointing of what factors further those rights.
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POLITICAL ISLAM AND
SECULAR DEMOCRACY
THE RISE OF THE REFAH PARTY IN TURI<EY

BROCK. TAYLOR

Tbe Re/a/J Pm1J' mlfred tbe political {lrellt! ill TlIrkel' {II (I lilJle Jl'ben flie pllblic/elf political parties were IIIJre.rpotlsil'e
alld tbe /!,!Jl'frllIllfllt Jl'as cormpt. The part)' d}(/I!~ed tbe plliJlir:r e:\pec/ri/iolls 0/ politiml parties tbro!(!!,Ii ,!!,({!SJroofs
mIllPa{!!,llil~!!, alld re.rpollsil'f ROl'emiIZ!!,. /~ltllo!(!!,11 tile Relrz/I Part)' Iitls/o!IJld it difliC/llt to/ai/a}}' tbrot(!!,b lJ·it/J IIlall), 0/ it.r
m/lIPa(1!,I1 prolJlisl'.r wilbollt illmrrilZ!!, Im;!!,e costs to tile ,~ol'ertl/J/eJlI, Ibe rise ojflie Reltlli Pm1y /Jas bad a pmjotilid ill/pact
Oil TlIrkisll po/din.

T

he secularization of the Turkish political
s\'stem has left little room for religious organizations to influence governmental institutions.
1\ccess to political power is extremely difficult
for religious organizations. Indeed, the vast gulf
dividing church and state as outlined in Turkey's
secular constitution is seemingly unbridgeable.
The military, seeing themselves as the defender of
Kemal Ataturk's secular democracy, have made the
gulf even wider. I t is under these conditions that
political Islam, embodied in the Refah Party, has
recently emerged upon the Turkish political scene
as an important political player. The Refah Party's
issue-based campaign propaganda and approach
to governing have changed the political system in
Turke\' by increasing the people's expectations
of what government officials ought to deliver:
namely, that government oHicials should act as
representatives of the people, furthering interest
articulation and interest aggregation.

A BRIEF

HISTORY Of' P()LITICS 11\ Tl'RkEY

The polarization of income classes has caused
the Turkish government to become an unrepresentative elitist entity. In fact, Turkey has one of
the ten worst income distributions in the world.!
"The pattern of high income inequality in Turkey
has undoubtedly been exacerbated by the chronically high rates of inflation that have existed over
the past two decades.'" Barry Rubin noted, "The
main political parties are arrogantly unresponsive
to public needs. Government, bureaucracy, and
the political elite view themselves as the society's
master rather than as public servants.'" This elitist
conception, held by most Turkish governmental
officials, has caused governmental corruption to
become the status quo in Turkish politics. Indeed,
scandals and corruption have discredited almost
all of the political parties." In particular, the severe
damage to Turkey's infrastructure caused by the
earthquake of August 1999 illuminated a number
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of corrupt political practices, including the government's failure to enforce building code regulations.'
Although for a number of years the people of
Turkey have been critical of the rampant corruption
and apparent inefficacy of governmental regimes
to represent the rights of the people, little progress
has been made in cleaning up the dark corners of
Turkish politics.
The party system in Turkey has traditionall,"
been deadlocked. The lack of consensus in the
Turkish political
party scene arose
from a seemingh-

A political vacuum
opened the door for the
rise of political Islam as
an alternative to secular
social democracy.

perpetual internal contlict be-

Part\".
In municipal elections on i\larch 27, 1994, the
Refah Party stunned the Turkish political community b" winning 19.1 percent of the national ,-ote.
This strong showing allowed the Refah Party to
capture two hundred man>ralties, including Turke,-'s
two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. After the
earl\" general elections took place on December 24,
1995, the Retah Part\" emerged as Turkey's majorinpolitical part\" with Necmettin Erbakan as the
Prime i\linister, 15H of the 550 parliamentary seats,
and 21.4 percent of the national H>te. Shorth"
thereafter, in what many in Turke\" call a "soft
coup," the Turkish military pushed the Refah Pam"

alternative to secular social democracy.

out of office in June 199 7 . In response to the
demands of the militan', the Constitutional Court
banned the Refah Party on Januan- 16, 19()S, ruling
that the party's religious platform violated Turkey's
secular constitution. However, shortl\" after the
Court's decision, the Islamists reappeared \"et again
as the Virtue Party."
The Virtue Part\" suffered major losses in the
election of 1999, yet the movement remains active
and very much alive. It is interesting to note that
the upcoming ultra-rightist National Action Part\",
which made tremendous gains in the election of
1999, has used the same t'-pe of political rhetoric formerly used by the Refah Part,". Indeed,
the consequences of the Rctah Party's success in
organizing a grassroots political moyement has
had an enormous effect on the Turkish political
system.

TlIF RISE OF POLITIC\L IsLM" II\: TL'RI-':EY

TIlE Rn,\Il P,\RTY'S POLITICAL C\i\II',\IC;l\

Islam as a political platform first emerged on
the Turkish political scene in 1970 with the
formation of the National Order Party, which was
shut down in 1972 b,- the Constitutional Court.
However, shortly after the Court's decision, the
leadership of the National Order Party, headed
by Necmettin Erbakan, reorganized the Islamic
party under a new name, the National Salvation
Party. After the military takeover in 1980, the
National Salvation Party was also closed down by
the military for violating Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which forbids the use of religious
propaganda for political purposes. Erbakan reemerged upon the Turkish political scene in 1984,

The Refah Party's political campaign was
replete with references to "cleaning up" goyernment. The partl-'s campaign promise of honest and
competent government managed to present itself
as the natural alternative to secular social democrats whose administrations were characterized as
ineHicient, incompetent, and corrupt. I" Some ha,-e
attributed much of the pam-'s strength to the upstanding moral character and personal standing of
the party's leader, Necmettin Erbakan. 11 Furthermore, the Refah Party was able to capitalize upon
voter disillusionment with corrupt center parties
by rhetorical statement in favor of a "i\1oral Order"
and a "Just Economic Order."12 This rhetoric "was

tween competing
elitist entities." 1\S
a result, party
politics have consistently failed to translate voter demands into
public policY.- Other apparent results included voter
disillusionment and a "corresponding erosion in
social rights, including both a decline in the bargaining capacit" of labor unions as well as a
reduction in the degree of entitlement to key social
sen-ices in the areas of education, health, and
social security.'" The increasing inability of the
state to cater to the demands of its constituency,
especially the demands of the poor, the disadvantaged, and excluded minority groups, created
a political vacuum. This political vacuum opened
the door for the rise of political Islam as an
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establishing his third Islamic coalition, the Refah
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accentuated by the part\'\ attempt to portra\'
itself as pious i\luslims motivated by thc fear of
Allah,I'
The traditional weakness of Islamic movcments in Turke\' indicates that the appeal of
political Islam as an alternative to secular social
democrac\' arises not only from the strength of
its moral argument in fm'or of equity, but also
from specific and concrete campaign tactics and
political strategies used by the party, II The rise of
the Refah Party as an important political player
in Turke\' was facilitated by a highly organized,
grassroots political campaign, including highh'
rhetorical political propaganda and target-oriented
pre-election incentives,
OR(;\l\;U\TI()K\L C\:\]I',\]C;" STR.\TH;]I:S

The Refah Part\"s organizational strength
proved to pLw an important role in intluencing the
electorate, thus facilitating the election of Refah
officials to offices of intluence. Paradoxicalh', in
an age where the mass media established itself as
the dominant mode of communication, the Refah
Party placed major emphasis on grassroots organizations and face-to-face contact with the electorate. The political campaign of 1994 exhibits the
strength of the Refah Party's organizational tactics.
\\'omen went door to door handing out tliers,
soliciting support for Refah candidates. Party
supporters sought out and spoke directly with
members of the electorate likeh' to support the
Refah movement, persuading individual voters to
jump on the Refah Party bandwagon. Candidates
were out among the people expressing their view
and receiving feedback from their constituenC\·.
The part!· gave enormous attention to step-by-step
mobilization of local party representatives, with
parh' militants diligently coming into personal contact with potential voters. These contacts gradually
built support for the party b!' establishing close,
personalized relationships. Computer technology
was exploited to accumulate and process information on people likely to vote for the party. These
organizational tactics afforded strategic advantages
to the Refah Part\· over all other political parties,
especially over the social democrats who were
in organizational disarray and clearh' disregarded
issues relating to voter mobilization at the grassroots leveL I.

The grassroots tactics of the Refah Parh' proved
to be extremely effective in motivating the electorate to support Refah Part\' candidates. In addition,
by speaking directly to the electorate and by
becoming connected with their constituency, Refah
Parh' officials became conscientious of the indi\'iduals the\' were to represent. This awareness, in
turn, led to responsible governing and attempts to
truly act as civil servants. Refah Party leaders gained
widespread recognition for their effective performance on a local leveL In fact, in Refah-controlled
municipalities, the party gained a reputation for
honest, clean government. However, this reputation was not without blemishes. Mayor Erdogan,
a member of the Refah Parh', admitted that even
after four \'Cars in office he was unable to completely eliminate bribery in a municipalit\" that
emplO\'s more than 3(),()()() workers. In total, eight
mayors associated \vith the Refah Parh" were investigated for corruption. I" However, the number
of Refah Part\' officials accused of corruption was
considerabh' low
when compared to
other political parties. l - Indeed, "for
the most part, Refah mayors have
been more eftlcient
and less corrupt
than their predecessors."'~

These

The rise of the Refah Party
as an important political
player in Turkey was
facilitated by a highly
organized grassroots
political campaign,
including highly rhetorical
political propaganda and
target-oriented
pre-election
.
.
IncentIveS.

general trends demonstrate the Refah Party's connectivity with their
constituency.
The Refah Par- '--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'
ty's ideological populism and grassroots organizational tactics tapped into the people's desire to
organize and express themselves politically. "In
essence, the populist party serves as the missing
emotive and cultural nexus between actors within
the state and the larger strata of society. The Refah
Party", populist par excellence, has played exactly
such a role in Turkey."I" By providing a vehicle for
the Turkish people to voice their views and express
their opinions regarding political issues of concern
to them, the Refah Party has dramatically altered
the political system in Turkey. The emergence of
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this simple form of interest articulation, previously
enjoyed only b," the elite, was a revolutionary
phenomenon in that by empCl'.vering the individual
it laid the groundwork for redirecting political
power back to the masses. Through this process,
many individuals realized the intluence that they
can assert through active involvement in the
political system. ~ow that the voice of the people
has been heard, it will be diftlcult for other political parties to gain access to political power \vithout
also pro\"iding a mechanism where constituents
can voice grievances and feel that they are being
heard.
RIIET( lRIC\L

candidates were able to gain support from voters
otherwise unlikel\, to support the Islamists.'"
The municipal elections of i\larch 27, 1994,
also demonstrated Refah's commitment to inc1usionar\' politics and the vocalization of social
issues, such as clean government, waste disposal,
and prohibition of pornographic tllms and programs on television." 1,," focusing on issues directly
affecting the electorate, the Refah Party set a new
standard for Turkish politicians. Previously, political
parties primarih" focused campaigns on oraton° of
oftlcials' attributes while arrogantly ignoring issues
affecting the electorate. The Refah Party, on the
other hand, has now effectivel\' modeled representative rhetoric. A suftlcient number of citizens
caught the \"ision of what the Refah Party was

C\j\W \1(;1\

To complement their grassroots organizational
trying to do: address the
tactics, the Refah Party efconcerns of their confectiveh" used highly rhetoristituency. Subsequenth",
cal political propaganda to
campaIgn rhetoric In
gain support for their coTurkel' became far more
alition. The 1991 campaign,
issue-oriented. The Turkorchestrated bl" some of the
ish people have since
young I slamist intellectuals
used their votes to reand campalgn managers,
ward candidates who efshowed the Refah Party's
fectively address major
commitment to addressing
political issues; the electhe issues. The political campaign was conducted on ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' torate, conversely, has
also withheld their votes from candidates and
billboards, on television, and 1n the press. Depolitical parties who fail to communicate their
pictions of human protlles and social issues of

The "Just Order"
emphasized income
distribution and the
moral obligation of
the state to improve the
economic conditions
of the poor.

concern to Turkish citizens were extremeh"
prevalent. These depictions included young men
searching for jobs, a female student (wearing
the traditional head scarf) longing to attend her
university classes, a retired man asking for a better
standard of living, and a middle-aged woman
(without a headscarf) promoting environmental
awareness. The portrayal of a noncovered woman
poignantly attests to the party's inclusionary
strategy. The entire campaign incorporated an
inclusionary tone focused on issue-based politics.
Conversely, other political parties based their
electoral campaigns on the personal attributes of
their leaders. The Refah Party's choice to focus
on issues of local importance enabled the party to
gain the support of many voters who would
have otherwise been skeptical of an Islamic party.
Furthermore, by using each part of their campaign to target specific social groups, Refah Party
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position in regards to societal problems."
Pt 'BLlSIIFD
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The Refah Party's use of verbal rhetoric to
address and respond to the issues is unprecedented
in Turkish politics. Additionalh", the Refah Party
took another step forward by making their political
agenda available to the public in writing. This is
evident by. the election manifesto booklet issued b,"
"

the Refah Party for the December 1995 election. In
this booklet, the Refah Party addressed and presented a number of concrete solutions relating to
the Kurdish population in Southeast Turkey. These
measures included the repopulation of evacuated
villages, a specitic program for the economic
development of the region, the repeal of the state
of emergency rq.,'Ulation, and lifting the trade embargo imposed on lral] by the United Nations.'; B,"
addressing these issues directly and also presenting

BROCk TAYLOR

had become alienated from the Turkish political
concrete solutions, the Refah Party gained the
sl'stem. T Indeed, the economic theories of the
support of a majority of kurdish citizens.
"Just Order" rna\' have been "stronger in colorful
Catering ones' political campaign toward a
rhetoric than in substance,"'" but the importance of
certain group of minorities is another revolutionan"
this portion of the Refah Pam"'s campaign is not
model in Turkish politics. This model has since been
the soundness of their economic ideas. Instead, it
successfulh" replicated b\ many prominent political
is the remarkable manner in which they worked
parties in Turkel' and is, in turn, becoming an
toward the betterment of Turkey's standard of
important part of the Turkish political process.
living, not onh" b," vocally addressing specific issues
Uwing to the plurality of political parties in Turkey,
but also bl' formulating specific strategies that
minorin" groups are growing more and more
were
attractive to the people.'" This is representaintluencial in political circles. In response, a number
of minorities have organized themselves into active
tive government at its 6nest.
The Turkish people recognized and responded
interest groups." The degree to which these interest
to the Refah Part\·'s revolutionary model. Abdulgroups will replace existing elites as powerful politibaki Erdogmus, a r";'urdish citizen, stated, "Refah
cal pla,"ers is a matter yet to be determined. It is
is the onll' political partl' which is outside the SI'Simportant, however, to recognize the profound
effect the Refah model , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , tern, and it can fulfill the
has pla,"ed in facilitating a
political ,,"stem in which
interest groups are becoming intluential plm"ers In
national politics.
TilE "Jlsr ORDER"

The Refah Part\" developed a concise economic plan that directly
addressed the concerns of

All other political parties
in Turkey find themselves
being judged according
to the Refah Party's
hi'gh e r st an dard 0 f
listening and responding
bli
to pU c opinion.

changes we desire . . .
justice and freedom under
the guarantee of law.";"
Another Turkish citizen
stated, "The Refah Party
spent more time and energy discussing equality,

social security, welfare,
and social justice than any
other political party, inL-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--1
cluding the leftist parties.";[
This clearly shows that people acknowledged and
the lower income classes regarding the distribution
appreciated the Refah Party's effort to reform the
of wealth and income. In their campaign, Refah
political
system in Turkey. By discussing the issues
Party candidates focused upon the party's goal
of concern to the people, the Retah Party has raised
of establishing a "Just Economic Order" (adi!
the standard for political responsiveness; the people
ekullulJlik dIlZetl). The 'Just (hder" was made up of
of Turkey are now requiring more from their
thirty-one articles dealing with socioeconomic
elected officials. Expressly, Turkish citizens are
issues. Refah Part'" candidates used the economic
now demanding governmental officials that not
theories encompassed in the "Just Urder" to
only vocalize the issues but also produce plans to
rhetorically emphasize income distribution and
effectively deal with the issues. Dr. Mehran
the moral obligation of the state to improve the
Kamrava states that, owing to the Retah Party, "the
economic conditions of the poor, disabled, and
level of public scrutiny of the government has
disad\"antaged. Furthermore, the "Just Order" was
greatly increased."" Furthermore, as a result of the
used to emphasize the importance of free enterRetah Party's political campaign strategies, Turkish
prise, private investment, and commercial activity,
citizens
are now demanding that political parties
thus minimizing the role of the state"'; Although its
use their campaigns not only to address but also to
economic promises might have been intlationary if
present solutions for the ills that affect society.
put into practice, the "Just Order" was exactly
what the average Turk wanted to hear.'" In fact,
the Retah Party's political discourse of the "Just
Order" became extremely popular among the
poor, especially among I";'urdish populations who

ATfEi\Wr T( 1 p( lRTRAY A SECl'L\RIZED POUnC\L ISLAM

During the 1996 election, the Refah Party
focused on portraying themselves as a modern
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political party. Refah Party candidates appeared on
television debates without any of the prominent
indicators normally associated with an Islamic
movement (no beards, for example). Additionally,
candidates were attentive to appear well dressed by
\Xiestern standards." By adjusting their apparel to
conform to the secular tastes of the electorate, the
Refah Party showed their commitment to representing and including all Turkish citizens. Although
this is a minor detail, it is ne,"ertheless quite remarkable that Refah Party candidates listened to
public opinion and responded by conforming
personal practices. This responsiveness is extraordinary because other political parties haye continued to keep themselves aloof from public
opinion, focusing instead upon the attitudes of the
elites. '" The Refah Party has again established an
important paradigm. Due to the positive actions of
the Refah Party in responding to public opinion, all
other political parties in Turkey find themseh-es
being judged according to the Refah Party's higher
standard of listening and responding to public
optnlon.

An additional factor that aided the rise of
the Refah Party was its incentive-based campaign.
Indeed, the Refah Party supplied their constituents
with more pre-election incentives and post-election
services than their secular competitors. These inkind incentives that
the Refah Part\· municipal candidates
distributed generously among the
poor right before
the March 1994 municipal elections and
the general election
of December 1995 had tremendous effects in
shifting voters' support toward Refah Party candidates. Muzaffer Dogan, the Refah Party mayor of
Bahcelievler, distributed 1,500 tons of coal during
the winter months to the poor, 2S0-kilogram
grocery packages during the holy month of
Ramadan to 3,S()0 families, clothing for 100
university students, and even paid for the circumcision ceremonies of 1,000 children. Additionally,
"Mehmet Sekmen, the Refah Party mayor of Kartal,

Fifty-seven percent of
the 2,722 Turkish
respondents did not
think they could criticize
the government.
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reportedly distributed not onh- coal and groceries
to prospective voters, but also money and gold
coins. Furthermore, Refah Party n1a\'ors have also
provided clothing and soup for the poor.;' These
in-kind incentives were not just an attempt to gain
political support. The\' also represent the Refah
Party's attempt to respond to the demands of their
constituenc\-. This response is another important
breakthrough, in that Turkey's other political
parties "fail to translate voter demands into public
policy." In fact, "except for Refah, there is little
ideological or programmatic difference between
the parties.";" I ndeed, "as the income di"ide further
widens, the only civil organization to work with the
economicalh- disadvantaged sectors of society en
masse is the Refah Party."'- Although the purit\· of
the Retah Part\"s moti,'es in helping the neech' right
before a major election ma\' be questionable, one
cannot deny the fact that the Refah Party did make
significant efforts to both identit\, and assist the
poor and disadvantaged.
The tact that Refah officials recognized a number of social problems and made concerted efforts
in response to these social ills sa\'s much about the
Refah Party's approach to representative governing. As a Turkish journalist, Dogu Ergil, puts it,
"Refah is the vehicle that is carrying the marginal,
downtrodden, and neglected to the center of
power. 1t will never lose its grip because these
people were not represented before. No [other]
political part\' represents the people at the political
level or the popular level and there are no [other]
grass-roots organizations to intluence the state.";'
Again, Refah's ability to respond to public opinion
that translated into effective public poliC\" has increased the people's expectations of how government oHicials should act in office.
AI'I'R( lAClI T( l

G( l\,ERl\:I~(;

Refah Party officials' performance tn oHice
demonstrates the part\-'s commitment to representative governing. Many Refah ma\'ors have instituted important administrative mechanisms such
as "peoples' councils," where mayors and other
government officials meet with constituents once
a week to hear their grievances. '" Government
officials inviting criticism is a revolutionary phenomenon in Turkey. This is particularly impressive
when contrasted with the results of a recent
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political poll that found that 57 percent of the
2,"722 Turkish respondents did not think the\' could
criticize the government.''' 13\, their success in
ad,'ancing interest articulation and interest aggregation, Refah mayors have raised the bar for what
constitutes a "successful record" for a ma\'o[. Subsequently, the future mayors of Turkey, regardless
of their party affiliation, will be held to a higher
standard."
Commentators agree that politicians who can
effectively address and deal with the metropolitan
phenomena of garbage, potholes, and mud will win
reelection. The major political parties have tended
to a,'oid these subjects. However, Refah Party
politicians not only made campaign promises to
deal with the filth, but they also followed through
by cleaning up a number of Turkish cities. In
January 1997, an observer reported that in
municipalities controlled b\, the Refah Part\'
"busses run, the garbage is collected, and social
services in general hm'C improved,"" In addition,
a journalist from the ClwiJtiali .\'cifllte }\[ollitor
commented on the changes that have occurred in
the Refah-run municipality of Sincan since the
Refah gm'ernment took oHice: "Three years ago
this town was known as 'i\\ud Sincan,' because of
neglect from pre"ious secular local gm'Crnments,
which residents say were corrupt, but Sincan today
is well-paved, boasting green areas and a huge
children's park, and most people have water."" In
Istanbul, reporters have noticed that "rubbish is
collected regularly. Trees have been planted and
better coal has been introduced to replace the foul
lignite responsible for the Istanbul winter smog.""
The Refah Party's commitment to action is
unprecedented in Turkish politics, These small acts,
directed toward the betterment of living conditions
in Turkey, have accomplished a greater good for
society in that "people's expectations of what the
state ought to deliver are increasing."" This change
is owed to Refah's representative policies.
However, the Refah Party's comparativeh'
superior service record did not come without
accompanying costs to society. In fact, taxpayers
arc now picking up the bill for many of the Refah
Party's municipal improvement projects, through
substantial price inflation on basic staples such as
bread and gasoline. Furthermore, the Refah Party's
use of government funding for popular subsides

has left the Social Securit\' Administration heavily
indebted to foreign creditors.'''
j\dditionally, despite the Refah Part\''s implementation of mam' successful policies, the\' have
failed to come through on a number of important
campaign promises. The longer Refah oHicials were
in oHice, the more ap- r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
parent it became to
Turkish citizens that
the Refah Party's rhetoric was based more
on symbolism than on
substance."- Furthermore, the Refah Party's attempt to appease
the
powers-that-be
caused the movement
to abandon mam' of
its basic principles."

The Islamic theme of
championing the
periphery against the
center and the
particularism of Islamic
culture has become a
source of identity for the
youth of Turkey.
L ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----"

For example, although the part\' was somewhat
successful in eliminating old-fashioned bribery, it
has since been replaced with "voluntary contributions" to party organizations and the directing of
municipal contracts to party faithful. Refah Party
oftlcials demonstrated that they are not above such
abuses of power. 1" However, when the positive and
negative of the Refah Party's approach to governing are aggregated, one must conclude that the
Refah Party played an important role in changing
Turke\"s political system for the better. This is
especially evident when the Refah Party's approach
to governing is compared with that of other
Turkish political parties.""
DFYFL()Pi\IEI\:T
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CIVIL S()CIETY

Turkish political anah'st Dr. Debbie Lovatt
noted, "Since the Islamist Welfare Party led by
Necmettin Erbakan came to power in July 1996
following the 1995 elections, a young but dynamic
civil society has been particularly apparent."il The
rise of newly formed civil organizations, independent of traditional political parties, is strong evidence of the intluential role the Refah Party played
in increasing the expectations Turkish citizens have
for their government officials. Indeed, by creating
an environment where government officials were
accessible and responsive to public demand, the
Refah Party has encouraged the creation of civil
society groups. In particular, the resurgence of
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labor parties in Turkey is a notable ad,"ancement.
The labor strike of March 6, 1999, is an important
example of the power civil society groups have
gained. ~'ork halted as 5,()()(J workers demonstrated
in the streets of Ankara. The~' demanded the right
to negotiate pay b\' means of collective bargaining.
l\lthough the government later consented to a
20 percent pay raise, it was later obliged to promise
an additional 10 percent raise in October." The
results of this strike (nameh' that the people spoke
and the government responded) are remarkable,
especially when contrasted with the attitudes of
government official prior to the Refah Party's
ascendence to power. The resultant pa,' raises
obtained through the strike of March 6 clearly
demonstrate the changes that have occurred and
are continuing to occur as a direct result of the
Refah Partl·'s approach to representative governing.
TIIF n'Tl'RF
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Although the Refah Party was pushed out of
office, and its daughter organization, the Virtue
Party, suffered major losses in the election of 1999
(ironically due to Virtue Party officials inability to
rise to the level of popular expectation left by the
Retah Party), the Islamic movement has renewed
hopes." The Islamic theme of championing the
periphery against the center and the particularism
of Islamic culture has become a source of identity
for youth of Turkey. In fact, a recent surve,' found
that 45 percent of those who voted for the Islamic
partl· were between the ages of fourteen and
thirty-four. By contrast, most of those who voted
for the social democratic parties were over the age
of thirty-five. The Turkish Generation X seems
to be oriented toward the Islamic movement.
Additionally, if the economy continues to falter, it
may provide an opening for the Islamic opposition
to revive its fortunes. i.
The success of the Refah Party has permanently changed the political system in Turkey. Even
if the Islamists are unable to regain the political
prominence they once enjoyed, their mark upon
Turkish politics will remain. The Refah phenomenon has created a political climate in Turkey where
political parties are expected to more fully represent the interests of their constituencies and
also provide a greater number of much-needed
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services. B\· responding to the demands of the
people of Turkey, Refah has engendered in their
constituencies an understanding of the power the
people may possess if they are well organized and
effectively voice their concerns. This understanding
has translated into a political society where interest
articulation and interest aggregation are tar more
prevalent than ever before. The consequences of
the Refah Party's success in organizing a grassroots
political movement will continue to be felt in future
elections.
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MACHOISM AND THE RAPE
EPIDEMIC IN SOUTH AFRICA
SHIMA BARADARAN
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wise grandmother from Ilitha, a rural
communit\, in the Eastern Cape of South
Africa, once said, "You can sense the kind of
community. YOU
are in by- the \vay- the children
play." At a community meeting in this same town,
this woman stood and said that rape is the biggest
problem they faced. South Africa has the highest
rape statistics of all countries not at war. A woman
is raped every twenty-six seconds, and one in three
South IHrican women will be raped in their lifetime. ' Rape is an epidemic in South Africa.
To explain the epidemic of rape, people in
South /\frica usually blame high rates of unemplo\'ment, poverty, lack of education, drugs and
\X'estern intluence through the media. However,
these reasons alone do not account for the
overwhelmingly high incidence of rape in South
AJrica. i\lachoism, or exaggerated masculinity, is
a root cause of the South African rape epidemic
requiring analysis. Objectification of women and
use of \'iolence as a problem-solving mechanism
are characteristics of machoism found among the
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Xhosa-speaking people of South Africa. Located
in the Eastern Cape of South Africa, the Xhosa
are the second largest national group of black
South Africans. I lived among the Xhosa-speaking
people for four months researching rape and
violence. Although machoism is found among
whites and especially among other black groups in
South Africa, the scope of my research will focus
on machoism in Xhosa culture.
This paper will address two different causes
for machoism among the Xhosa-speaking people
of South Africa: culture and inferiority. The first
section of this article defines machoism and its
relation to apartheid. I then discuss characteristics
of machoist cultures that express the link between
sex and violence and lead to the objectification of
women. These characteristics include male dominance, infidelity, traditional marriage customs
of bride wealth and bride raiding, and violent
relationships among youth in Xhosa culture.
The final section of this article shows how
inferiority and culture lead to violence against
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women. South African rape convicts are perfect
examples of those who objectit\ women and use
violence to get what they want. The attitudes of
South African rape convicts are similar to machoist
attitudes of average South African men. The only
element that sets rape convicts apart from average

In a society where men
feel powerless, they
"dehumanize women
and accentuate their forced
subservience to men" in
order to feel in control.

men is the fact that they
were convicted for acting
on the machoist socialization in their culture. A
machoist culture that objectitles women and has
high rates of ,-iolence will
also have high rape rates.
The rape epidemic In

South Africa will not end
until machoism is rooted
out not onh· of Xhosa culture, but South African
culture as a whole. By examining machoism and the
effects of apartheid in Xhosa culture and relating
machoism and inferiority among South African

rape convicts, I will show in this article that
machoism is correlated with the rape epidemic in
South Africa.
i\L\C11< )[s:\!
Machoism is exaggerated masculinity that
attempts to compensate for men's feelings of
powerlessness or inferiority. This exaggerated
masculinity is often expressed through violent
crimes, such as sexually exploiting women. 2 In
machoist societies, the "culturally preferred goal is
the conquest of women.'" Rainwater's 1964 study
comparing research from Mexico, Puerto Rico,
England, and the United States found that lowerclass males from all regions suffer from job insecurity and compensate for this by "exaggerating
their masculinity and subordinating women." I One
study asserts that a father's lack of affection for his
son is the origin of feelings of inferiority. 1t shows
how the separation, distance, and fear of the father
forces boys to be self-sufficient. i This leads to a
notion of machoism that transcends generations,
as the boy uses cultural means to satisfy the psychological need for approval denied to him through
childhood. Although father distance is evident in
Xhosa culture, this is not the only cause for
machoism among Xhosa men. The psychological
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theon' of machoism shows that inferiorit\· is the
common characteristic among Xhosa men and
other men in machoist cultures.
Inferiority in black South African men is caused
lw multifaceted oppression on economic, social,
and political levels created by the apartheid s\·stem.
Apartheid began in 1941l when the Afrikaners instituted this 5\'stem of "apartness" and the new
gm'ernment created different "nations," each with
separate homelands, so whites would not have to
"mingle with inferior peoples."" Apartheid was a
system representing the "coditlcation in one oppressive S\'stem, all the laws and regulations that
had kept ;\fricans in an inferior position to whites
for centuries."- Apartheid oppressed blacks in
many aspects of life as it destro\'ed the traditional
famil\', undermined stable social conditions, and
removed political power. Because the blacks were
citizens of their own "homelands," the government allowed them to live in pm-ert\' and destroyed
the traditional famil\' through forced migration for
work. The Group Areas l\Ct, instituted b\· the
apartheid gm'ernment, separated residential areas
for each race. Non-whites were mo,'ed into
townships, where crime rates increased \\'ith the
destruction of stable communities. Blacks watched
their communities and Iifest\·les destro\'ed at the
mercy of a government that continued to create
new laws to further reduce their rights. The!' had
no representation in gm'ernment and lived with
the "anxiety of [political] impotence.'"
As a "generation of people who have been
actively marginalized and brutalized by their
society," oppressed black men became the primary
perpetrators of violence." Known as "comrades,"
the men rose in political protest to regain autonomy and reassert masculinity in the "face of a
system that disempowered black men." They
claimed, "There are no girls doing the attacking,
only men. \Ve are men. How can we tolerate being
attacked by men?"I" To counter their political
powerlessness, black men used violence to control
women, whom thn' cultural Iv dominated. In these
circumstances, violence is a "symbol of stren~>1:h
and power in the machismo ethos" and is seen as a
"means of regaining human dignit\', esteem and
respect."11 In a society where men feel po\\'erless,
they "dehumanize women and accentuate their
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forced subservience to men" in order to feel in
control. I' Besides directh' causing political violence
in South j\frican culture, apartheid caused inferior~
in' and led to interpersonal violence among blacks.
En~n though apartheid officially ended in 1994,
blacks remain oppressed in South Africa and still
npress machoist traits. /\lthough South Africa is a
democratic country and the black man is theoreti~
calk eCjual to the white man, the effects of hun~
dreds of ,-ears of oppression take time to Elde. The
blacks are still the most disach-antaged group in
South Africa, with the most unemployment, least
opportunities for education, and highest levels of
pm'ern-. Realistically, most blacks still have little
power to change their situation to live up to their
traditional role as men. i\lam' black men still have
little control to change their situation and often
compensate for this powerlessness with machoist
practices like violence. South Africa has had a
history of violence, from ancient tribal wars to
apartheid. This history has led the people to be
immersed in a culture that uses violence as a means
to soh-e problems.
\L\(I I( liST TR.\ITS 11\ XI i()S \

CI Tn 'RI'

There arc distinct gender roles among the
people: the man is the undisputed
head of his famil\'. \X'hen he goes out with his wife
he walks in front. She follows tlve or six paces
behind with her bab\' on her back and their luggage
on her head. I; There is even a Xhosa saying,
III/Plll/dll zendoda ZifZ~pli{//II/Ji!i: "I::'~ven the behind of
the man is still in front [of the womanJ."11 The man
is the decision maker and is culturalh' responsible
for controlling his home and famih'. He is per~
mitred to use am- means, within reason, to control
his family. The Xhosa man, as a respected com~
munity figure, must never be seen without a hat,
jacket and a stick. He must always have a stick with
him to assert control over his environment. Some
people joke that Xhosa men always "have a stick
under their pillow, for their wife."I" In contrast, the
Xhosa woman "is a child"l.. and is silent in
decisions pertaining to her family and community.
She is to "supply the man with what he wants."IThere are defined gender roles in Xhosa culture
that enforce male dominance as a characteristic of
machoism. There arc many factors that contribute

Xhosa~speaking

to the exaggerated machoistic traits among Xhosa
men. The link between sex and violence, the tradi~
tional male circumcision ceremon\', bride raiding
and the bride wealth system are some distinct
causes of machoism in Xhosa culture.

The link between sex and violence is vital in
illustrating the correlation between machoism and
the high rate of rape in Xhosa culture. Sex and
violence arc both prevalent among Xhosa youth,
which has led to widespread violence in sexual
relationships. In a study of health among Xhosa
women, researchers discovered that the most
important problem among the youth was sexual
violence. I, Most interviews illustrated that men
not onl\, set the time and conditions for sex, but
in most cases use violent strategies to forcefully
initiate sex.I' Sex often involves a beating, with the
man forcing himself on the woman. These tind~
ings arc not uncommon: when South African
women were asked about their t1rst intercourse,
30 percent reported that the,' were forced into
sex.'" Ph\'sical assault during sex seems so common
that women often see it as an expression of love.'1
The extent of this abuse
is shown in a stueh- of
six hundred teenagers in
Cape Town: 60 percent
of the women sun'eyed
said they had been
beaten by a male part~
ner. ()ne woman de~
scribing relationships
said, "as a woman you have no rights, you must keep
quiet and do as the man wants."" An overwhelm~
ing trend in Xhosa culture is the use of \'iolence
in sex. This link between sex and violence IS a
manifestation of machoism in Xhosa culture.

The circumcision
ceremony also
enforces violence as
the means for male
control.

M,\LF CiRCl.']\[CISI()t\

One of the only traditional ceremorues still
practiced religiously by most Xhosa~speaking
people toda,' is circumcision. It is a cultural cere~
mom- common in machoistic cultures to teach boys
how to be men, which in turn promotes machoism
in Xhosa culture. Xhosa culture is a culture that
"favors the use of physical violence" as a rite of
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passage." Boys have no standing in Xhosa social
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status and are merek "things."'· In his late teens, a
Xhosa traditional marriage is not regarded as a
boy undergues this "painful initiation ceremony
mutual Yenture. Instead, marriage is the sale of
at 'puberty ... which publicly ddines a bo\' as a
a woman. Sex is rarely a consensual event; cusman."" This ceremony includes a period of
tom justitles a man raping a woman if he has paid
separation and education. During the sacred
for her. \X'omen are bought and sold as objects
under the bride wealth system, rationalizing rape in
circumcision ceremony, the bo\'s are isolated for a
marriage. Bride raiding, a custom that encourages
period of three weeks. \\'ithin this time they are
rape as a method of marriage proposal, is rarely
circumcied and taught iw their ciders how to
behave like a man. The boys learn, among other
practiced anymore but still has implications in
things, to obtain a wife and land, how to tlght, and
Xhosa culture today. The Xhosa traditions of
to never cry or show any pain. The circumcision
bride wealth and bride raiding lead to machoism as
ceremon\' enforces gender roles by equating
they condone the objectitlcation of women In
weakness' with femininit\.·, control with manliness.
,
marnage.
The actual circumcision teaches the boys that
The traditional Xhosa bride wealth system
real men have no weak and undesirable feminine
allows women to be controlled as propert\', free to
be exchanged b!' men. The Xhosa man pm's lobo/a,
traits. Xhosa men belieye that the,' are never to
show weakness, for they are in ~------------------ or bride wealth, for his bride
control. During the incision,
an\' sign uf pain is feminine
and weak, and men must be
strong in every circumstance.

Men rape as much for

£

power as or sex.
L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

Circumcisions are usually performed in groups,
and any wincing of pain at even another boy's
circum~ision is call for being chased away and
beaten by the group.'" Nelson Mandela recalls the
pain of his circumcision forcing him to pause
befure calling out the phrase "I am a man" after
the incision. His short pause before proclaiming
manhood worried him, as he felt he had shown
weakness. T This is an enforcement of exaggerated
masculinity, where any sign of weakness a boy ma,'
have retai~ed from b;)vhood must be forced out as
he becomes a man. Xhosa men are unrealistically
expected to always be strong, showing no fear or
pain. The circumcision is vital in emphasizing male
dominance and gender roles in Xhosa culture.
The circumcision ceremony also enforces
violence as the means for male controL In the
process of learning how to be a man, the Xhosa
boys must learn the importance of tlghting with
sti~ks and being the master of the home. This
promotes physical violence as an acceptable means
of asserting control oyer the enyironment Xhosa
men rule. This enyironment is their family, property, and community. The circumcision ceremony
promotes many machoistic traits as it links manhood with violence and control while linking femininity with weakness.
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after consulting with her
father and the elders of her
famil\' on an agreeable price.

l\fter this point she becomes
his propert\', like his land or cattle, and must
submit to his desires. The woman has no choice in
whom she will marry, nor the price for which she
is exchanged. This traditional yiew of women as
property implies that a man ma\' use any means to
control his wife as he would his other property.
There are injustices to women under the bride
wealth system all across the world. A cross-cultural
study of ninet\' societies practicing bride wealth
sho~ed that H4·.5 percent of them also engaged in
wife beating." After marriage, the woman is
obliged to submit sexually to her husband if he has
paid /obo/a for her. When asked what he would do
if his i-;1r1friend would not haye sex with him, une
rapist said, "1 would never force sex because 1 was
not married. It is not her dun' before marriage.
Once she is married, though, and yOU haye paid a
lot of money for her, then it is her duty."'" The
Xhosa bride wealth system causes women to be a
man's exchangeable property. This system also
justifies the physical abuse and rape of women in
marnage.
The traditional Xhosa marriage condones rape
not only after bride wealth is paid but as a method
of marriage proposaL Bride raiding is not
commonly practiced today, but the beliefs behind
this practice are still common in Xhosa culture. A
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woman becomes property to a man when the
pa\'ment of la/Jo!a is made by the future husband to
the girl's fatheL J\t the same time, plans are made
for "the abduction,"'" The marriage proposal
begins as the groom ph\'sicallY carries the woman
m\'ay. The father sends the girl out on an errand
during the time she is to be taken for marriage. At
the designated spot three or four young men wait
for her, and the leader of the yOung men tells her
she is to be carried off. The friends of the husband
"rough1\' grab her" as she screams and struggles to
get loose. Often the girl has no prior knO\vledge of
or choice about being "carried off" to marriage. If
she refuses to walk with them they "drag or carry
her m.vay without any suggestion of respect." She
is outnumbered with little chance of escaping.
Eyentually she ends up in the
home of the man. ()nce she is
there, her new husband must
haye sex with her before she
escapes. If necessary, the men
who helped abduct her would
help restrain her while her
husband has sex with her. This
ensures that she has been
damaged by him; the lobola
cannot be returned and she
cannot return to her family. Thus, traditional Xhosa
culture encourages bride raiding, which involves
aggressive and violent rape of unsuspecting
women. Bride raiding and the bride wealth sYstem
both illustrate the gross inequality between Xhosa
men and women, an inequality that promotes
machoistic behaviors."

a battle with the Zulu tribe, and he had sexual
relations with all the women of the tribe while the
men were gone. To punish himself when the men
returned, Somaquazee went into the bush and
circumcised himself in secret. As a result of
the unfaithfulness of Somaquazee, the men of the
Xhosa tribe continued the tradition of circumcision
from that dm' forward." The Xhosa circumcision
ceremony started with men wanting to celebrate the
infidelity of Somaquazee. The storY of Somaquazee, now a hero for his infidelity, is now told
during the circumcision ceremony. EYen toda\',
boys are encouraged to have sex with many women
after circumcision. The traditional surgeon actually
tells them that their wounds heal faster the more
they practice their manhood and have sex. I, The
fact that Somaquazee is a
hero celebrated 10 the
circumcision ceremony reveals the views of Xhosa
men on unfaithfulness. In respecting Somaquazee, Xhosa
men encourage infidelin';
by circumcising themselves,
they are striving to follow
his example.
The newly circumcised
bo\'s are encouraged to continue exerting their
masculinity with extramarital affairs even after the"
are married. When asked why they were unfaithful
in relationships, many nineteen to twenty-one-yearold Xhosa-speaking men claim that they get these
ideas from the elders. The older men are a "ven'
bad influence" and will be married and go out
with younger girls. One young man commented on
the parental pressure to be unfaithful: "Your father
"vill brag how he used to have many girlfriends
and he will tease you, calling you a isisil1l!JIatlf,
someone who doesn't have any girlfriends, who
is afraid.""
Although studies have not yielded hard
statistics, I interviewed many Xhosa women in the
Eastern Cape and discovered that most women
insist that up to 85 to 90 percent of Xhosa men are
unfaithful to their wives or girlfriends. Zuko, a
family counselor at FAl\ISA (Family and Marriage
Association of South Africa) who deals with
infidelity on a daily basis, claims that infidelity is a
problem among Xhosa men because "women and

People all over South
Africa are starting to
speak out against rape:
"We ended apartheid
in this country. We
can stop rape."

I ~1Jl)ELITY
Infidelity is another machoistic trait in Xhosa
culture. ~lale infidelity often results from treating
women with emotional disregard. In mac hoist
mentality, manhood is linked with sexualit\,. In
machoistic cultures, the man with the most sexual
relations receives the most praise among his
peers." r\ large aspect of the male circumcision
ceremony glorifies infidelity, common among rape
cOO\'icts as well as eyident among average Xhosaspeaking men in South Africa.
The circumcision ceremony originates from
the infidelity of Somaquazee, a hero of the Xhosa
tribe. He was the only man left in the village during
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sex are a wm' of proving you are still desirable and
sexualh' attractive,"'" Sexual relationships prove to
Xhosa'men that they are masculine because they
link numerous escapades with acceptance as a
man. Regardless of age, the more women a Xhosa
man has relations with, the higher his status among
men. This is illustrated by how open many
Xhosa men are about having more than one girlfriend at one time, Of twenty-tlve college-age
Xhosa women interviewed, 50 percent claimed that
unfaithfulness was the biggest problem in their
relationships; only 3(J percent said they trusted
their boyfriend. Today, Xhosa men often (werexert
their m~nhood and ~re unfaithful to women because of traditions in the culture and social pressures enforced by elders.
1 found si~1ilar trends of infidelity and
objectification in the South African rape com-icts
1 interviewed. They viewed women as important
only for the fulfillment of sexual desires. i\Iany
rape convicts had several girlfriends at one time,
a display of emotional indifference towards these
women. One rapist described his past relationships
with women, "] did not have steady relationships
but only sexual ones, ] would move from one girl
to the ~ext. , .. 1 would have two to three girls per
day. There were no emotions, just sex."'- This rape

co~vict had a shockingly relaxed attitude about sex
and considered women to be disposable. He was
robbing someone one day when he felt sexually
aroused, and he decided to rape the woman
because it had been two davs since he had sex. A
sixteen-year-old rapist described how he and his
friend brought his girlfriend to his house. He had
sex with his girlfriend and allowed his friend to
rape her afterwards. He waited outside until he
thought his friend would be finished and then went
back to tell her to go home so he could go to his
other girlfriend's house. This rape convict displays
the machoist trait of intldelity, demonstrating
complete emotional disregard for his girlfriend as
he allowed his friend to rape her. In the eyes of
many rapists, women are objects to use until
they are satisfied, and then the women can be
indiscriminately shared among friends. Infidelity is
prevalent among rape convicts, as the,' do not
allow themselves any emotional attachment with
women.
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Rape convicts show, in many cases, how
machoistic traits lead to rape in Xhosa culture. In
South r\frica, the socialized method of "achie\'ing
instant solutions" to problems is through violence."
()ne juvenile rape convict, an accomplice in the
gang rape of three women, describes spending a lot
of money on them. The men expected to be "paid
back" b,: the women by having sex with them.
\X'hen the women refused the offers, the men beat
and raped the women for three da,-s. '" These young
rapists thought it was appropriate to use \'iolence to
have sex with women if they did not cooperate.
The juvenile convict admitted he would not ha\'e
beat the girls if they had not resisted. The boys had
no sadistic desire to hurt the girls but felt it
appropriate to use whatever means necessan' to get
sex. It was the bo\,s' immediate response that the
o-irls' refusal of sex called for violence.
h
. r\nother rapist, after being sexuall\' rejected b,'
women for four years, raped to prove his manhood. He saw th~t all his friends had girlfriends
and felt inferior for not being able to get a girlfriend, He began "fighting and being angn'" with
the girls who rejected him, He would even hit girls
if they disapproved of him. One rapist describes
the woman he raped "pleading and crying for me
to just leave her" as he raped her for 3ll minutes.
He told her that he could not leave her until he was
satisfied. The same rapist said that rape can never
be stopped because "if] cannot get Isex], land] I
need sex, 1 must force somebod\'."'''The machoistic
traits exhibited by rape convicts are not exclusive
to the convicted: the onh' difference bet\veen
the rapists' attitudes of sex and violence and the
average Xhosa man is that the rapists were caught
for acting on their attitudes.
Men who rape tn' to prove that they are "still
sexualh' and physicallv dominant" and in controL"
Often 'they prove their masculinity through sexual
violence because they feel inferior. One rapist
describes his feelings after a rape: "I was the best,
I had put her down."" This rape convict proved
that he was a man because a woman was "bcrwing
down" to him." Several rapists interviewed made
comments that lead to the conclusion that they
raped to assert their masculinity. One man was
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insecure about his sexual performance and brutalk
raped his girlfriend because she was cheating on
him. He used violence to show her that he was just
as much a man as the other men she was with:"
:\nother rapist describes his friend raping a woman
and the woman grabbing his feet and tripping him
as she struggled. He became angn' that this woman
dropped him into the mud, and he told her, "1 can
show \'OU m\' pri\-ate organs, tool Because she
pulled me until 1 fell, I thought that she thought
I was unable to have sex with her. I wanted to show
her I ha\'e male organs tool" The machoist mentalit\, is present in several rapists interviewed, as they
used rape as a method of gaining power and
proclaiming their manhood.
l\lam' rape com'icts inten'iewed described a
feeling of power \\"hen \vomen resisted. The
resistance reaffirms their control, as they force a
woman to submit to their will. i\len rape as much
for power as for sex. ()ne of the juveniles inter,
viewed held three women hostage for three days
while he and his three friends raped them. On the
second day he was bored and \\'anted to let the girls
go because the girl he raped the previous night
began to show affection for him. The girl he \vas
raping stopped resisting; he was no longer in
control and the sex became mutual. His three
friends continued to enjoy raping the other t\vo
girls, who did not stop resisting.' Another rapist
describes the power that rape gave him because it
turned him on when the girl screamed. He commented, "1 knew I was hurting her. It gave me
power. 1 was in control.""" Rape convicts, although
extreme examples of Xhosa machoism, show that
machoistic traits fostered in the Xhosa culture are
what lead them to rape.

rape-the "ne\\! national sport." Charlene Smith,
a journalist who was raped this year, spoke out
recently: "\'{"e ended apartheid in this country. \X'e
can stop rape." The rape epidemic can be stopped
with changes in cultural attitudes and machoistic
behavior among men. On August 9, 1999, a \\'0men's Day pledge read, "\X'omen's rights are human
rights. If the\" continue to be neglected, South
Africa can never be more than half a democraC\·."'i\lachoism in South Africa must be rooted out
by people joining together against oppresslon,
violence, and the objectification of South Africa's
women.
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Thomas L. Friedman, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999. 349 pp.
In his book Tbe Lf.\."//J tllld tbe O!il'f 7/'1'1',
Thomas Friedman, the well-known columnist for
the ,'\f1), ) ork 7IJIICJ, presents his insight into the
new world order of globalization. His collection of
anecdotes and inten'iews with a myriad of public
and private sector moguls presents a fascinating
insight into the global economic revolution that is
replacing the Cold \,\'ar as the modern world's
dominant political s\'stem. In his view, the world is
onjy ten \'ears old: the fall of the Iron Curtain
signaled a rebirth in international affairs.
Friedman's main thesis concerns the balance
between the modernized \vorld (the Lexus) and
those enclaves where tradition still outweighs
wealth (the olive tree). In his exploration of the
global economy, he finds that many nations eager
to join the new society are trying to preserve
ancient cultures while becoming another happ"
cog in the grO\ving global economic machine. The
rewards of the new system are great, but the risks
arc also substantial; each nation must choose
carefulh" how it will pursue its entrance into the
new economic order.
In his book, Friedman details the changes that
have created this new globalization. Electronic
data transmission and countless other high-tech
innovations have fashioned a society where
evernhing happens in high gear. Friedman asserts
that the fast-paced economic world is only going
to get faster; those markets and nations that cannot keep up will be left behind. Contributing to the
high-speed nature of the world these da,'s is the

"Electronic Herd," a nameless group of investors
and speculators that follm,\'s the wealth around the
planet, making and breaking entire nations overnight, The Herd will reward the nations who play
by the rules of the new game; those who refuse to
plaY the game will be punished by a mesmerizing
tlurry of capital outtlow-made easih' accessible
to the average Joe via the Internet, The author
uses the East Asian economic crisis as one example of the power of this Electronic Herd,
where a hot investment opportunity turned bad
and the entire world felt the implications of the
Herd's passage,
Another aspect of this ne\v economic reality
is Friedman's "Golden Arches Theorv of Conflict
Prevention," He notes that no two countries
with McDonald's franchises have ever gone to
war against each other. His supposition is that
the increasing interconnectedness of the global
marketplace makes war an increasingly dangerous
proposition, as much for the provocateur as for
the victim, In a world so anxious to build wealth,
traditional power contexts arc becoming meaningless, dissolved in the rush towards economIc
interaction.
What makes this book fascinating are the
interviews with real people who have witnessed
the incredible changes in the world's economy
firsthand. Investment bankers, rainforest preservationists, reporters, and government bureaucrats all make it into the book with their heartfelt
comments about globalization. Each has his or
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her own story to tell, and Friedman's experience
as a reporter ties the stories together in a very
effective and readable stde.
The book disappoints, however, in its lack of
attention to details. \'('hile the anecdotes are catching and witty, they are not complemented at all b\'
statistical data related to these dramatic changes,
The personal interviews are excellent examples of
hO\\' the new world economy has changed, but the
personal side of globalization cannot cover the full
extent of those transformations. Even more troubling are the imaginary inten'iews and com'ersations between world leaders (whom Friedman mm'
or may not have met while writing his book). And

,'et the imaginary conversations are placed alongside real intervie"vs and given the same credence as
real people and their conversations.
Nevertheless, the book is very entertaining, at
times even provocative. I t is memorable in its presentation and style. Yet it fails as an end-all description of the ne\\' global economy. Friedman's forte
is reporting, not analysis. Although several of his
points are \'en' insightful, there is more glamor
than substance. The book is an important introduction to globalization, but it must remain only
an introduction.
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Martha K. Huggins. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998.248 pp.
In the closing pages of Political Po!i(i1~~: T/)f
Uilited Sfa/eJ alld J -elfin /jlJlfnCa, J\[artha Huggins
uses the analogy of a "protection racket" to
illustrate the role of social control in the creation
of new states. Essentially, in the creation of a
protection racket, a government, "by providing protection from violence ... builds up its
capacity for control and hegemony" (199).
Through this analog\", Huggins proposes that the
United States's attempt to save Latin America from
the threat of communism contributed to the creation of authoritarian regimes that pursued social
control by exterminating personal liberties. Herein
lies the great irony of US. intervention: as the
United States sought to protect its hemisphere
from the evils of imported communism, it fostered the creation of authoritarianism, a form of
government ill-suited to promote the fundamental
American values of life, liberty, and freedom.
Huggins is clear in her analysis of US. motives
in Latin America: the United States needed absolute
assurance that the dreaded "domino effect" of
communism would not occur in its own backyard.
To gain this absolute assurance, the U.S. intlltrated
internal security systems of those Latin American
countries most at risk of embracing communism.
Through training foreign civilian police, the United
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States established a network of loyal and trusted
contacts within Latin American governments who
allowed the US. access to sensitive information,
information which permitted the C.S, to monitor
communist and other subversi\'e activities. The
surface motive was to promote criminal justice
in Latin American governments. However, as
e\'idenced by intervention programs in Guatemala,
Bolivia, Chile, and most notably Brazil, U.S. training of civilian police forces had the consequence,
whether intended or unintended, of further
suppressing human rights. An abundance of
information contlrms that U.S. training taught
Latin American police methods of torture, riot
control, and public execution. Though difficult to
pinpoint Huggins's overarching thesis, her series of
micro-theses illustrate how U.S. assistance to Latin
American police helped centralize Latin American
internal security forces and make them more
militarized, authoritarian, and subversive.
Throughout her book, Huggins uses a SOCK}logical approach to present her information concerning political policing. Biased by her discipline,
Huggins seeks primarily to describe how l'.S.
political policing affected the "sociolog\' of
policing" in Latin America (ix). Huggins seeks to
re-create for the reader the culture of fear

A. SCOTT FLEMING / I~ACEY WIDDISON-j ()~ES
experienced by oppressed Brazilian citizens. llsing
personal accounts of both victims and prosecutors, particularly in the final chapters of her book,
Huggins shows how ll.S. training centralized,
professionalized, and politicized the Brazilian
police, which in turn demoralized members of
Brazilian society. Huggins clearly shows how the
l.'nited States silently watched as Brazilians lost
their freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
and freedom from arbitran' detention. Huggins's
use of specific detail gives a unique perspective,
especialh' concerning how comic strip writers and
fashion designers responded to this oppression. j\t
the same time, Huggins's use of detail also shows
that her anah'sis primarih' focuses upon the social
rather than the political or economic effects
of political policing. I t is evident that the study of
police oppression drives Huggins, shown lw
her in-depth anah'sis and research throughout her
book. ""Ioreover, it is apparent that Huggins carries
an emotional attachment to her subject. This
attachment may have biased Huggins, causing
her to exclude positive information concerning
C.S. foreign police training, as well as negati,'e FS.
responses to police oppression of the ci"ilian
population.
Despite Huggins's personal biases, her sources
are outstanding. In the preface, Huggins admits
the inherent diftlculties of her research, primarily
in uncovering proof of U.S. actions recorded in
covert documents. Because of these difficulties,
past scholars have done little reasearch, leaving
Huggins \I.'ith very little to draw from. Therefore,
reh'ing almost completely on primar\" data,
Huggins searched government documents, including congressional hearings, FBI contact information, and, most importantly, information from the
infamous Office of Public Safety (OPS). To her
credit, in the face of much diftlculty Huggins
was able to conduct personal interviews with
twentl.'-seven former members of Brazilian police
forces. Such first-hand information from those
im'oh'ed in police actions is extremely convincing,
though emotionally charged.
Because Huggins's research appears to be
groundbreaking, this book could easily become an
essential text for those studying political policing
in Latin America. \X'hile this book is signitlcant for
those studying U.S.-Latin America relations, this

information could also be useful for political
scientists and sociologists. Huggins's greatest
strength is the quality of her research: she certainly
provides adequate evidence to support her thesis.
At the same time, however, Huggins fails to
remain focused, adding information that docs not
tie into her central thesis. In her discussion of
intelligence-gathering information organizations,
for example, Huggins has a great deal of breadth,
but at times insufficient depth. Rather than
including scattered information on less-signitlcant
internal security programs, Huggins's research
could be strengthened by additional analysis of the
most important organizations, such as the OPS.
\'{'hat could Huggins's research mean for the
future of FS.-Latin American relations? Perhaps
Huggins's most signitlcant achieyement is exposing information about the depth of US. inYoh'ement in what some would see as a non heroic and
immoral mission. Huggins's research details an
unfavorable ,'iew of U.S. world motiYes. Thus, the
greatest impact of her research is that it decreases
trust in the C.S. government-from j\merican
citizens who were protected from such "sensitive"
informatiun, and from Latin Americans who
suspected, but perhaps did not fulh' belieye, that
the Cnited States was capable of permitting such
grave yiolations of fundamental human rights.
-I"":.\CFY WIDD1S( )"'-j ()"'ES
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